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INTRODUCTION 
oday the presence of an American lawyer in mainland 
China is a commonplace characteristic of contemporary 
Sino-American relations.1 In fact, as China has become an in-
creasingly critical part of American foreign affairs, judgments 
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 1. See generally STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN 
CHINA AFTER MAO 5 (1999); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH 
TOWARD RULE OF LAW 564 (2002). 
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of Chinese law are routinely cited in American commentary.2 
Especially in recent decades, evaluating the role of law in Chi-
na’s potential liberalization is a staple of American popular and 
public debates.3 Although American lawyers lament perceived 
deficiencies in Chinese law, they also eagerly engage the oppor-
tunities presented by China’s modern legal development. In 
both criticism and engagement, American lawyers express a 
desire or assumption that their efforts will help shape Chinese 
law along American lines. However, this impact is expressed 
with a confidence contradicted by more sober evaluations of 
China’s current legal reforms and the limits of American influ-
ence therein.4 
While much has been written in recent years exploring con-
temporary developments in Sino-American legal relations, it is 
quite remarkable how much has already been lost concerning 
America’s earlier legal history with China. It has almost been 
completely forgotten that, prior to 1949, China was often held 
out as America’s most promising foreign site for the export of 
American legal influence.5 This idea grew out of the larger no-
tion that American law represented something new and vi-
brant to be shared with the world, a notion which had excitedly 
possessed the early twentieth century American legal commu-
nity.6 Even amidst often contentious domestic debates on legal 
reform, at the turn of the century American law began to be 
imagined as something not only exceptional, but reducible to 
an identifiable set of institutions and values capable of being 
exported across the globe.7 
In fact, many of the challenges and debates wrestled with by 
contemporary American lawyers in regard to China were fore-
                                                                                                             
 2. See, e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179, 
183 (2002). 
 3. See Jedidiah Kroncke, Law and Development as Anti-Comparative 
Law, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 477, 512 (2012), for an overview of the mod-
ern state of U.S.-China legal interaction in the contemporary. 
 4. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls? 
Problems and Prospects of U.S.-Sponsored ‘Rule of Law’ Reform Projects in 
the People’s Republic of China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64, 92–97 (2000). 
 5. CAROLA MCGIFFERT, CHINA IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL IMAGINATION 31 
(2003). 
 6. See Jedidiah Kroncke, An Early Tragedy of Comparative Constitution-
alism: Frank Goodnow and the Chinese Republic, 21 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 
533, 535 (2012). 
 7. See Kroncke, supra note 3, at 509. 
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grounded in key developments already well underway during 
the early twentieth century internationalization of American 
law. The Janus-faced visage of Chinese law as both an exciting 
new frontier and a recalcitrant challenge for the American 
lawyer has roots that go far deeper than China’s post-1978 reo-
pening to global society. One vein of this deeper history, and 
perhaps the most striking precedent lost from this era, is the 
telling experience of the most famous American lawyer to serve 
as a legal reformer in China, namely one-time Harvard Law 
School Dean, and preeminent legal scholar, Roscoe Pound. 
Once a great comparativist who championed American en-
gagement with, and learning from, foreign legal experience, 
Pound, by the end of his career, became a parochial exporter of 
American law and a fervent believer in American legal excep-
tionalism—conceived as the idea that American law was the 
most advanced in the world and thus standing outside and 
above international legal development.8 Abandoning his early 
trenchant critiques of American law that employed foreign ex-
amples, Pound was swept up in the spirit of the day, which in 
the international arena set aside the complexities of American 
law for an often idealized vision of American law ready for ex-
port abroad. Pound’s tenure in China thus serves as a caution-
ary tale for the liabilities that such belief holds for contempo-
rary Sino-American affairs, and America’s current relationship 
to foreign legal experience more broadly. 
Consider then that in the summer of 1946, Pound found him-
self far removed from the familiar life to which he had grown 
                                                                                                             
 8. The conception of “American exceptionalism” has been notoriously dif-
ficult to narrowly define. See IS AMERICA DIFFERENT? A NEW LOOK AT 
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM, at v–xi (Byron E. Shafer ed., 1991). See also 
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED 
SWORD 18 (1996) (explaining the “double-edged concept” of American excep-
tionalism). “Legal exceptionalism” has been no less difficult to pin down. In 
the contemporary era, the term is used to refer to either (a) American rejec-
tion of international legal norms or (b) the use of foreign legal examples in 
American judicial decision-making. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional 
Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 
109–11 (2005) and Harold Hongju Koh, International: Law As Part of Our 
Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 56 (2004), for support of the use of foreign and in-
ternational law in American jurisprudence. Compare Steven G. Calabresi, “A 
Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s 
Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1338 (2006), reject-
ing the citation of foreign law in American court decisions. 
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accustomed during his long tenure as one of Harvard Law 
School’s most prominent faculty members. In contrast to Cam-
bridge’s summer lull, Pound was settled into a bustling expat-
riate neighborhood outside of Beijing, China. Much like it is 
today, Pound’s Beijing was awhirl, not with the rapid trans-
formations of modern globalization, but with the intensifying 
Chinese Civil War that had grown out of China’s thirty years of 
instability after the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. 
As the ever-ambitious Pound had come to China in his late 
seventies, this new, and often chaotic, setting tried and tested 
his fortitude. Yet even though he was far removed from his 
routine academic comforts, Pound’s mind was more alive than 
it had been in years. With great excitement, he believed he was 
living out what many Americans had come to imagine for dec-
ades—China’s Americanization.9 
For decades, Pound, as with the vast majority of Americans, 
had been informed about China’s development through con-
tacts in the religious missionary movement. Long inundated 
with tales of his great fame in China by his missionary-
affiliated interlocutors, Pound readily accepted the invitation of 
the Guomindang Party (“GMD”), then in power throughout 
China’s urban centers, to serve as the highest-profile legal ad-
viser the Chinese government had employed in decades.10 
Pound’s appointment represented the most heralded individual 
effort to date among the growing ranks of American lawyers 
who had begun to travel abroad as reformers with increasing 
frequency during the early twentieth century.11 Public officials 
and private citizens on both sides of the Pacific lauded his ap-
pointment with grand language. This rhetoric was particularly 
grandiose in America, where great fascination had been 
aroused concerning China’s political fate since the Chinese Re-
public was first announced in 1911. 
                                                                                                             
 9. See MICHAEL H. HUNT, THE MAKING OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP: THE 
UNITED STATES AND CHINA TO 1914, at 270, 313 (1983); MCGIFFERT, supra note 
5, at 31–34. 
 10. During the 1910s, famed Progressive scholar Frank Goodnow had 
served as an adviser to Yuan Shikai, China’s first president after the fall of 
the Qing Dynasty in 1911. See Noel Pugach, Embarrassed Monarchist: Frank 
J. Goodnow and Constitutional Development in China, 1913–1915, 42 PAC. 
HIST. REV. 499, 500–01 (1973); Kroncke, supra note 6, at 553. 
 11. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON, SPREADING AMERICA’S WORD: STORIES OF ITS 
LAWYER-MISSIONARIES 119–24 (2005). 
2012] ROSCOE POUND IN CHINA 81 
Yet for all the fanfare and high expectations that this 7000 
mile trek inspired in his contemporaries, Pound’s time in China 
is the least studied episode of his otherwise well-studied life.12 
In recent decades—even with American legal reformers return-
ing to China with new vigor—Pound’s experience in China has 
lived on primarily as a historical curiosity, interred within an 
occasional academic footnote. 
In theory, this forgetting could simply be the result of 
Pound’s ultimate failure in China. By most any measurement, 
Pound had little impact on Chinese law prior to the GMD’s de-
feat by the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) in 1949. But, in 
reality, the roots of this forgetting are more complex. They 
reach beyond the details of Pound’s personal efforts in China to 
how his reform work reflected the assumptions of the modern 
form of American legal exceptionalism. Pound was no longer 
the firebrand comparativist using foreign legal experience to 
improve American law; rather, he had become a putative bea-
con for the export of American law. The great irony of Pound’s 
personal failures in China is that, while they were forgotten, 
this export view of American law abroad was nevertheless pro-
gressively normalized throughout American legal culture. 
Thus, to evaluate this forgetting one must understand that 
American perspectives on Pound’s appointment as a legal ad-
viser to China reflected and informed these historic shifts con-
cerning how American legal culture should and could relate to 
foreign law. Pound went to China with the expectation, shared 
by the larger American legal community, that as a legal advis-
er he could help transform the Chinese legal system, and thus 
Chinese society more broadly, along American lines. 
In fact, Pound’s experience in China highlights how the Sino-
American relationship in the early- to mid-twentieth century 
was an opening chapter of what is today called “law and devel-
opment,” previously thought to have originated in Latin Ameri-
ca during the 1950s and 1960s.13 Moreover, Pound’s story clari-
fies how American legal exceptionalism shifted from its more 
                                                                                                             
 12. Even after three major biographies and numerous close studies, schol-
ars are continuously able to uncover new aspects of Pound’s life. See, e.g., 
JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF 
AMERICAN LAW 211 (2007). 
 13. See David M. Trubek & Mark Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: 
Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United 
States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1063–66 (1974). 
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rhetorical status in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to 
a set of concrete practices that directly impacted our relation-
ship with foreign legal systems and undermined the domestic 
status of American comparative law. 
Thus, Pound’s ultimate rejection of legal cosmopolitanism ex-
pressed a very different view of the relationship of American 
law to foreign legal systems than had previously been the norm 
in American history.14 Americans had long given law a promi-
nent place within their national identity, and exceptionalist 
visions of American law were at the heart of the Revolutionary 
spirit.15 However, the nature of Pound’s particular transforma-
tive aspiration in China signaled a different manifestation of 
this vision where American legal institutions could be trans-
planted abroad to Americanize the development of foreign legal 
systems.16 
By contrast, Pound had been educated within cosmopolitan 
intellectual currents prevalent in American law just decades 
prior to his time in China. At the beginning of his career, he 
had trumpeted America’s embrace of an inward-looking com-
parative law as a key element of its dynamic capacity for legal 
innovation. However, when Pound came to China, he was un-
concerned with what American law could learn from its Chi-
nese counterpart. Even though Pound draped himself in rheto-
ric that claimed to value diverse legal traditions, his mission in 
China was focused on the export of his ideal version of Ameri-
can law.17 
Pound’s writings on China and his work as adviser exemplify 
how this new version of American legal exceptionalism grew 
out of the interaction between ideas about legal evolution and 
legal science. In popular and academic legal writing of the era, 
                                                                                                             
 14. See, e.g., David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: 
The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of In-
ternational Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 934–946 (2010). 
 15. See Paul W. Kahn, American Exceptionalism, Popular Sovereignty, and 
the Rule of Law, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 198, 198–
203 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
 16. See Kroncke, supra note 6, at 543–44. 
 17. In many ways Pound’s arrival in China culminated two centuries of 
decline in the prestige of Chinese law in American legal culture. Several of 
the American Founding Fathers had studied China in their contemplations of 
how to adapt foreign legal experience to America’s foundational legal institu-
tions. See A. OWEN ALDRIDGE, THE DRAGON AND THE EAGLE: THE PRESENCE OF 
CHINA IN THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT 91–93, 264–68 (1993). 
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American law was commonly identified as the apogee of evolu-
tionary legal development.18 Further, Pound and others be-
lieved that modern American law had become so advanced be-
cause the scientific study of law, known as “legal science,” pro-
vided a methodological basis through which legal progress 
could be achieved using apolitical legal expertise. The fusion of 
the evolutionary and scientific views of law allowed Pound to 
make universalist claims about the methods upon which his 
foreign reform agenda was based, while in substance always 
promoting his version of American law as the normatively de-
sirable outcome. Thus, American legal culture could be re-
moved from the co-evolution of international legal debate and 
instead recast as a universal stimulus to legal development 
abroad. 
The specific story of Pound’s time in China, as with the gen-
eral story of Sino-American relations in twentieth century 
American legal internationalism, was obscured when the victo-
ry of the CCP in 1949 folded China into the larger framework 
of the Cold War. However, recovering and interpreting Pound’s 
time in China is important because it serves as an influential 
and illuminating precedent for the pitfalls of the export-driven 
view of American law that has become normalized today. Not 
only did Pound struggle, and ultimately fail, in his efforts to 
shape Chinese law, but he did so while grappling with the 
same difficulties modern American lawyers abroad recurrently 
face. Although his good intentions were part of the high spirit 
of the day, Pound influenced and echoed the marginalization of 
comparative law, which was in time replaced by the consistent-
ly disappointing export-driven agenda of today’s “law and de-
velopment.”19 At the same time, Pound’s inversion of his own 
original openness to international legal cooperation and ex-
change concurrently helped popularize the transformation of 
American legal exceptionalism from exemplification to export. 
It is important to understand that, whatever personal criti-
cisms will be made in this Article, Pound’s time in China 
                                                                                                             
 18. See generally LEWIS H. MORGAN, ANCIENT SOCIETY (Leslie A. White ed., 
Harvard Univ. Press 1964) (1877) and BROOKS ADAMS, THE LAW OF 
CIVILIZATION AND DECAY: AN ESSAY ON HISTORY (Norwood Press 1921) (1896) 
(both discussing the evolution and character of different stages of society). 
See also Steven Wilf, The Invention of Legal Primitivism, 10 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 451, 475–76 (2009). 
 19. See Kroncke, supra note 6, at 535. 
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should be read primarily as a story of tragedy. Although the 
GMD rejected his reform agenda in total, Pound’s attachment 
to the project of exporting American law led him to promote a 
rosy picture of his work in China. Unfortunately, this distortion 
only fostered and helped legitimize a set of critical misjudg-
ments about the nature of Chinese legal developments that 
were too readily adopted stateside. Pound’s inability to face his 
own failures not only misled domestic audiences about Chinese 
legal developments during his tenure as adviser, but rebounded 
into a virulent anti-Communism after 1949 that blamed Amer-
ica’s failure in China not on the export project itself, but on in-
sufficient domestic support for such efforts. Ironically, Pound’s 
failure in China helped usher in an era where overseas legal 
reform efforts were woven into the basic fabric of America’s 
Cold War foreign policy. 
To substantiate and elaborate upon this broader narrative, 
this Article presents the details and context of Pound’s career 
in Sino-American affairs. Part I outlines Pound’s early career 
and how he came to know and comprehend China through the 
missionary infrastructure that shaped Sino-American affairs of 
the era. Part II details his exploits during his formal tenure as 
legal adviser to the GMD, when he set aside his commitment to 
comparative law and embraced the new export-oriented view of 
American law abroad. Part III demonstrates how Pound’s 
stateside propaganda work for the GMD distorted American 
understandings of Chinese legal developments and their rela-
tionship to Chinese politics. Part IV reveals how Pound reacted 
to the events of 1949 by becoming a crusading anti-Communist 
who helped transform Chinese law from a vessel for American-
ization to being denounced as “Communist law.” This Article 
concludes with the lessons that Pound’s failure hold for Ameri-
ca’s contemporary relationship with the Chinese legal system 
as tied to the modern form of American legal exceptionalism 
and the concurrent enervation of American comparative law in 
American legal culture. 
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I. POUND AND AMERICA IN REPUBLICAN CHINA 
A. Pound’s Introduction to Chinese Law 
As the oft-recounted story opens, Roscoe Pound was born in 
1870 to a prominent frontier lawyer.20 His first love in life was 
natural science, and he earned a PhD in Botany from the Uni-
versity of Nebraska. He turned to law after only one year of 
study at Harvard. In 1895, following several unpleasant years 
in practice, he started teaching at Nebraska’s law school. Dur-
ing this period, Pound developed a robust critique of formal le-
gal rights and American jurisprudence, derived mainly from 
his early contact with Edward Ross and a host of other Pro-
gressive thinkers, including Lester Ward, Richard Ely, and 
John Commons. 
By 1903, Pound had risen to the deanship of the law school at 
the University of Nebraska. His rise to national fame followed 
shortly thereafter, notably after his 1906 speech to the Ameri-
can Bar Association (“ABA”) titled “The Causes of Popular Dis-
satisfaction with the Administration of Justice.” In this speech, 
he boldly declared that the American judiciary was in a state of 
marked decay—anachronistic in both its structure and its ju-
risprudential practices. Further, he stated that American 
courts were maladapted to the rapidly shifting contours of 
American society. 
Pound was sharply critical of contemporary common law 
judges’ use of abstract analogical reasoning to preserve existing 
doctrine in the face of countervailing social change, the product 
of which was Pound’s jurisprudential villain, the legal fiction. 
This criticism framed his famous critique of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York, which rested upon lib-
erty of contract theory and natural law.21 Pound’s solution to 
the pathologies of the American legal system was a new theory 
of judicial practice which he dubbed “sociological jurispru-
dence.” 
                                                                                                             
 20. The basic biographical details of Pound’s early life are relatively un-
contested and well covered by his major biographers. See, e.g., N.E.H. HULL, 
ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE (1997); PAUL SAYRE, THE LIFE OF ROSCOE POUND (1948). 
 21. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 42 (2011). 
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Pound grounded much of his early work in the aggressive 
championing of comparative law, and in 1908, he served as one 
of the first editors of the Annual Bulletin, a publication by the 
Comparative Law Bureau of the ABA. In doing this work, 
Pound asserted that America’s legal experience was but one of 
many internationally, and as such, foreign legal traditions 
were a critical source of reflection for American legal reform. 
At this time, Pound’s star shone brightly and he was soon of-
fered a position at Northwestern University, where his work 
was marked by both the reformist zeal of the day and the use of 
empirical social science to reform law.22 It was during his ten-
ure in Chicago that Pound articulated the core aspect of his 
theory of sociological jurisprudence, namely that studying law 
as a social science could yield a consistent and coherent system 
of rules that should replace traditional doctrine.23 
In 1910, the ever-increasing popularity of Pound’s work 
earned him another call, this time to teach at Harvard Law 
School. After just five colorful years in the classroom, he be-
came Dean. His initial writings at Harvard expanded upon his 
critique of the American judiciary and openly expressed great 
faith in legal reform’s ability to achieve “a continually more ef-
ficacious social engineering.”24 During the first decades of his 
meteoric rise, he continued to promote his particular interests 
in Roman legal history and Continental legal theory, and spoke 
glowingly about the need to understand foreign legal history 
and comparative law in order to promote American legal inno-
vation.25 
There is no direct evidence that Pound had any specific 
awareness of China during this phase of his professional life. 
                                                                                                             
 22. See DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 133–46 
(1974). Pound was brought to Northwestern by comparativist John Wigmore, 
who regarded Pound as an important figure in the American appreciation of 
comparative law. See MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING 
JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO 107 (2003). 
 23. See generally Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. 
L. REV. 383 (1908) (arguing that statutory law should be entitled to as much 
respect as common law due to statutory law’s accuracy as an expression of 
the general will). 
 24. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 99 
(1922). 
 25. See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 
1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19, 49 (David M. 
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). 
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However, it is hard to imagine that he was wholly insulated 
from the popular and academic images of China which had pro-
liferated in America in the early twentieth century, especially 
as he arrived in Cambridge during then Harvard President 
Charles Eliot’s widely touted trip to study China.26 The singu-
lar mention of China in Pound’s early writings is found in an 
article on procedural reform, in which he compares American 
with British consular courts in China to characteristically ar-
gue that the American courts were too formalistic and thus un-
responsive to their foreign social contexts.27 
What is readily clear is that China’s increasingly interna-
tionalized legal elite knew of Pound. While at Harvard, he 
taught many students from China. These students were part of 
the first wave of foreign nationals to come to American for legal 
study. They eagerly encouraged him to visit and lecture in 
their home country. Pound’s most prominent early Chinese 
contact was John Wu, who was soon to become China’s preemi-
nent international legal scholar. Wu’s tutelage under Pound at 
Harvard led to a lifelong correspondence.28 
Wu’s letters to Pound were full of grandiose flattery, and he 
told Pound that Pound’s influence and fame in China were 
great. For example, Wu wrote: “There is no telling how many 
adherents you, beloved Master, have won among the Orientals. 
I have heard some scholars of the younger generation say that 
what China needs is neither individualism nor communism but 
sociological jurisprudence.”29 Wu’s letters contained little in-
                                                                                                             
 26. See CHARLES W. ELIOT, SOME ROADS TOWARDS PEACE: A REPORT TO THE 
TRUSTEES OF THE ENDOWMENT ON OBSERVATIONS MADE IN CHINA AND JAPAN IN 
1912 (1913). 
 27. Roscoe Pound, A Practical Program of Procedural Reform, 22 GREEN 
BAG 438, 449 (1910). In some of his other early work, Pound does make sev-
eral references to “oriental justice,” but only to the classic effect of invoking 
the specter of despotism. See Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 22 (1914); ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 
56 (1921). 
 28. ROSCOE POUND PAPERS, Part 3, Reel 46, 417 (Harvard Law School Ar-
chive 601559) [hereinafter POUND PAPERS]. Pound and Wu exchanged letters 
consistently for decades. Note that Wu is known in Chinese circles by his na-
tive name, Wu Jingxiong. 
 29. Id. at Part 3, Reel 46, 432. Wu also told Pound that “Your influence, if 
that means anything to you, in this part of the world has been spreading like 
wild fire.” If that was not enough, Wu told Pound: “My Master, if immortality 
means anything to a mortal, then you ought to be happy to have won and 
witnessed it even while you are living and in the fullness of your powers.” Id. 
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formation about China itself, and Pound seemed generally in-
curious about Chinese law.30 In fact, Wu more frequently men-
tioned Christianity, as he had been a product of China’s first 
American missionary law school, the Comparative School at 
Soochow.31 
It was not until the 1930s that Pound took a more active in-
terest in China. Like most Americans during this time, he per-
sonally came to learn about China through his relationships 
with missionaries who comprised the first genuinely interna-
tionalized aspect of modern American society.32 Pound came to 
understand Chinese affairs, as had America, through the pub-
lic relations infrastructure of the missionary movement, an in-
frastructure that predated the formal American diplomatic 
service or other systemic institutional presence of Americans 
abroad.33 Not coincidentally, American missionaries, many 
trained as both lawyers and theologians, had been some of the 
first to argue for the catalytic power of transplanting American 
legal institutions abroad.34 And nowhere was this interest and 
                                                                                                             
at Part 3, Reel 99, 762. See also John C. H. Wu, Some Comments on Dean 
Roscoe Pound, CHINA CRITIC, Aug. 15, 1935, at 152; Yuen-Li Liang, Dean 
Pound and a New Approach to International Law, CHINA CRITIC, Aug. 15, 
1935, at 154. 
 30. In 1928, when Pound published the fourth edition of his course outline 
on jurisprudence, Wu’s work on Chinese legal history was the only selection 
of Chinese law. See ROSCOE POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON 
JURISPRUDENCE 155 (4th ed. 1928). 
 31. See William P. Alford & Shen Yuanyuan, “Law Is My Idol”: John C.H. 
Wu and the Role of Legality and Spirituality in the Effort to Modernize China, 
in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA 43, 44 (Ronald St. John Macdonald ed., 
1994). The school is sometimes referred to as Dongwu Faxueyuan or other 
variants reflecting institutional reorganizations and inconsistent translations 
from the era. 
 32. Foreign reform efforts were thus closely related in concept to the 
broader Progressive project of engineered legal change, and also exhibited the 
same consonance with the secular aspects of the Social Gospel. See JERRY 
ISRAEL, PROGRESSIVISM AND THE OPEN DOOR: AMERICA AND CHINA, 1905–1921, 
at 15–22 (1971). 
 33. See Margaret B. Denning, The American Missionary and U.S. China 
Policy During World War II, in UNITED STATES ATTITUDES AND POLICIES 
TOWARDS CHINA: THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN MISSIONARIES 211, 211 (Patricia 
Neils ed., 1990). 
 34. These missionaries believed the placement of American legal institu-
tions abroad might allow America to distinguish its international influence 
from that of the European colonial powers, particularly the British. See gen-
erally AMY KAPLAN, THE ANARCHY OF EMPIRE IN THE MAKING OF U.S. CULTURE 
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idea more focused than on China, the centerpiece of American 
missionary prestige and fundraising campaigns.35 
More specifically, since the early 1930s, Pound had been on 
various missionary mailing lists focused on China. In 1932, he 
was asked by W.G. Cram, General Secretary of the Methodist 
Episcopal Board of Missions, to act as a trustee of the Compar-
ative School at Soochow, a post which he quickly accepted.36 
Cram told Pound about the school’s project: spreading “Chris-
tian influence” in China through legal reform.37 
Pound’s relationship with Soochow set the stage for his first 
two trips to China in 1935 and 1937.38 In the early 1940s, 
Pound maintained his missionary connections, most notably 
when he accepted an advisory position with Harvard’s sister 
university in China, the missionary-funded and administered 
Yenching University.39 This background reveals that Pound’s 
invitation to serve as legal adviser to the GMD had a much 
more developed foundation than has been generally acknowl-
edged. 
In the same way that his time in China has been given short 
shrift by his biographers, Pound’s strong personal beliefs about 
the relationship between American law and religion have also 
                                                                                                             
1–7 (2002) (describing the desire for American foreign policy to avoid “Euro-
pean form[s] of absolutism,” as illustrated by the dissenting opinion in 
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 381 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); Roger J. 
Bresnahan, Islands in Our Minds: The Pacific Ocean in the American Liter-
ary Imagination, in REFLECTIONS ON ORIENTALISM 3, 5 (Warren I. Cohen ed., 
1983) (“Americans were politically and ideologically committed to setting 
themselves off from all things European . . . .”). 
 35. See, e.g., KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN 
MISSIONS IN CHINA 744 (1932) (describing “unprecedented levels” of American 
missionaries in China after the end of World War I). 
 36. POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, Reel 22, 880, 888. 
 37. “It is intended to organize such an appeal among the Christian lawyers 
in America in order that they may, as a gesture of international goodwill, 
give this Comparative Law School to our sister Republic of China.” Id. at Part 
3, Reel 22, 880. 
 38. Alison W. Conner, The Comparative Law School of China, in 
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JEROME A. 
COHEN 210, 238 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003); POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at 
Part 3, Reel 99, 815. See also Anna Ginsbourg, Roscoe Pound—An Apprecia-
tion and a Tribute, CHINA WKLY. REV., Apr. 24, 1937, at 12. 
 39. The first record of Pound’s missionary correspondence was from 
Charles Ernst Scott of the North China Theological Seminary. POUND 
PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, Reel 90, 729; Id. at Part 3, Reel 100, 738. 
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gone largely unexamined.40 The relationship of early twentieth 
century social-scientific thought to religion was a complicated 
affair that found diverse resolutions for even the most commit-
ted champions of scientific reason.41 The link between Progres-
sivism and the Social Gospel movement championed by main-
stream Protestant churches has a long scholarly pedigree,42 
with both of these early twentieth century American social 
movements tied to a common faith in human progress.43 
It is noteworthy that in his early work Pound made scant 
mention of neither Christianity specifically nor religion more 
generally. It was not until later in his career that he clarified 
his belief in the connection between Christianity and American 
law, even calling for a revival to reinvest American law with 
religious morality.44 Tying religion to his own theories of legal 
change, he further claimed that the influence of Christianity 
was central to the evolutionary progress of modern society.45 
He ultimately cited the centrality of religion to the legal order 
as the “acid test” of a society’s quest for longevity.46 
                                                                                                             
 40. Michael Willrich claims that Pound saw a great deal of his reform 
work as necessary because the state had taken over broad responsibility for 
regulating society in lieu of Christian institutions. See WILLRICH, supra note 
22, at 112–13. 
 41. See generally RONALD C. WHITE, JR. & C. HOWARD HOPKINS, THE SOCIAL 
GOSPEL: RELIGION AND REFORM IN CHANGING AMERICA (1976). 
 42. In brief, the Social Gospel was a U.S. movement that emphasized so-
cial activism and reform work as a key expression of religious faith and as an 
important modern means of evangelical proselytization. 
 43. The specific relationship between American legal development and 
religious ideas, however, remains generally understudied. But see HAROLD J. 
BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL 
TRADITION 31 (1983) (“It was the American and French revolutions that set 
the stage for the new secular religions—that is, for pouring into secular polit-
ical and social movements the religious psychology as well as many of the 
religious ideas that had previously been expressed in various forms of Cathol-
icism and Protestantism.”); HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II: THE 
IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 
16 (2003) (describing American law as a combination of “two conflicting belief 
systems—Puritanism, traditionalism, and communitarianism versus Deism, 
rationalism, and individualism . . . .”). 
 44. See Roscoe Pound, Law and Religion, 27 RICE INST. PAMPHLET 109, 
171–72 (1940). 
 45. Id. at 170 (“[R]eligion and morals and law [have] harnessed human 
nature to make it a servant of civilization.”). 
 46. See ROSCOE POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 34 (Transaction 
Publishers 1997) (1942). 
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Deeper investigation reveals that Pound had been well im-
mersed in the idea that America’s divine purpose was to im-
prove the world in its own image.47 Further, the secular appli-
cation of religious purpose was a central tenet of the modern 
Freemason movement in America, of which Pound was an ac-
tive member.48 Pound served as Master of his Lodge in Lincoln, 
and later founded Harvard’s chapter. Pound clearly articulated 
his Freemason beliefs in a series of lectures delivered in 1915, 
in which he emphasized the importance of the inspired indi-
vidual acting out the divine will by helping societies progress 
evolutionarily.49 Pound continued to lecture on Freemasonry 
throughout his legal career.50 
That such sentiments were submerged in Pound’s general 
writings, and have not been recognized as part of his intellec-
tual legacy. But more concretely, this missionary influence 
helps contextualize one important vector of how Pound was 
pulled into an export mentality. Pound, along with his mission-
ary interlocutors, wedded altruism to the practice of modern 
science. And like even the most open-minded missionary, 
Pound was ultimately involved abroad with a predetermined 
endpoint—the export of his area of passion and expertise. 
B. Pound’s Arrival in China 
Pound was seventy-seven years old when he retired from 
Harvard in 1946, ending nearly fifty years of teaching. Weary 
from his battles with Karl Llewellyn over the rise of Legal Re-
alism, Pound was quite unsentimental about his retirement. At 
the same time, China was wracked by political instability, as 
the GMD faced increasing pressure from the rural support of 
                                                                                                             
 47. ROSCOE POUND, CONTEMPORARY JURISTIC THEORY 2–3 (1940) (recount-
ing a story from Pound’s childhood about America’s divine mission in the 
world). 
 48. See generally BOBBY J. DEMOTT, FREEMASONRY IN AMERICAN CULTURE 
AND SOCIETY (1986). 
 49. See ROSCOE POUND, LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF FREEMASONRY 
73–88 (1915). Any serious attempt to evaluate Pound’s intellectual history 
ought to delve into the significance of this consistent belief in Pound’s life. It 
is sufficient to note that Pound saw himself as part of Freemasonry’s larger 
mission as “[A]n organization of human effort along the universal lines on 
which all may agree in order to realize our faith in the efficacy of conscious 
effort in preserving and promoting civilization.” Id. at 86. 
 50. See FRANKLYN C. SETARO, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITINGS OF ROSCOE 
POUND 127–32 (1942). 
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the CCP. In the years prior to Pound’s retirement, the GMD 
had begun to face increasing American criticism for its legal 
and political practices, which had initially formed the very ba-
sis of America’s broad faith in China’s commitment to Ameri-
canization. 
The extant GMD legal system reflected the Qing dynasty’s 
decision to primarily follow civil law models, explicitly infused 
with Leninist influences. As with Soviet law more generally, 
the GMD’s constitution and legal system placed few re-
strictions on executive or prosecutorial power. The GMD lead-
ership came to use this freedom quite often to exert dictatorial 
authority over its subjects. As a result, in the post-World War 
II era, many American observers in China began to question 
the GMD’s commitment to American liberal legalism, and con-
sequently the utility of continued American support for the 
GMD. 
Concurrently, Pound had not only maintained his interest in 
China but had become a strong critic of Progressive legal 
thought, casting it as at odds with the common law tradition he 
had grown famous for criticizing.51 He still favored social sci-
ence, but felt that the work of legal scholars was to provide 
empirical facts and social theories for common law judges to 
use in specific cases and not to replace judicial work in total.52 
Current studies of Pound are generally compelled to ascertain 
whether this change was in fact a great reversal and to divine 
some version of Pound’s true intellectual commitments. A pop-
                                                                                                             
 51. “That an engineering interpretation might be put to ill use I shall not 
deny. But for a season the dangers are in another direction.” ROSCOE POUND, 
INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 164 (1923) [hereinafter POUND, 
INTERPRETATIONS]. “We must not allow our faith in the efficacy of effort to 
blind us to the limitations upon the efficacy of conscious effort in shaping the 
law so as to do the whole work of social control.” ROSCOE POUND, THE TASK OF 
LAW 89 (1944). See also George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Admin-
istrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 
1557, 1590–93 (1996) (describing Pound’s attacks on the New Deal agencies 
and the connection he drew between such Progressivism and communist 
thought). 
 52. It was Pound’s emphasis on judicial decision-making that specifically 
placed him at odds with Progressives, who often saw judges primarily as ob-
stacles to the implementation of progressive legislation and the smooth func-
tioning of administrative governance. See generally HULL, supra note 20 
(providing an overview of Pound’s sociological jurisprudence and its relation-
ship with Progressivism). 
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ular theme in these evaluations dwells on Pound’s thirst for the 
spotlight and his constant need for personal affirmation.53 By 
contrast, others have focused on various periods of Pound’s life 
as different expressions of his ever unresolved intellectual con-
tradictions.54 
Thus, while most biographers discuss Pound’s trip to China 
in passing, they often do so only as a fleeting return to a lost 
enthusiasm for the social engineering of his early career. To 
some degree this is true, since Pound saw in China a new la-
boratory and proving ground for his vision of an ideal legal sys-
tem. Given Pound’s dissatisfaction with the trajectory of legal 
theory at his retirement, China held out the promise of being 
far removed from the frustrations he encountered in the Amer-
ican legal academy.55 Yet few have highlighted the fact that 
Pound saw his early trips to China as a global expression of his 
new agitation against the rise of centralized legislative and 
administrative power in the New Deal.56 Although his interna-
tional expertise was minimal,57 Pound had clearly been con-
cerned with global affairs at least a decade prior to his China 
                                                                                                             
 53. Once Progressivism became the norm, so the interpretation goes, 
Pound was no longer the center of controversy, and had to find new ground 
from which to draw public attention. This was a central thrust of Natalie 
Hull’s analysis, and John Fabian Witt summarizes and updates this position 
in his work. 
 54. For example, David Wigdor identifies what would be considered con-
servative sentiments early on in Pound’s work and what he calls a persistent 
dualism between Pound’s organicism and instrumentalism. WIGDOR, supra 
note 22, at 228–31. In addition, Willrich sees Pound’s work as grappling with 
a struggle to balance his more generalized view of the rule of law with his 
particularized conception of justice. See WILLRICH, supra note 22, at 316. 
 55. See HULL, supra note 20, at 257 (describing Pound as having “retired 
[from Harvard] under fire”). 
 56. See Robert W. Gordon, Willis’s American Counterparts: The Legal Real-
ists Defence of Administration, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 405, 406–07 (2005). 
 57. Dan Ernst has described how, at one point in the 1930s, Pound 
planned to conduct a comparative study of all the common law countries 
worldwide as an expansive statement of “the future of our common-law doc-
trine of supremacy of law in relationship to the development of administra-
tive agencies.” Dan Ernst, Pound Under Pressure, LEGAL HIST. BLOG (Sept. 
29, 2008, 1:00 AM), http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2008/09/pound-
under-pressure.html. The purpose of this project was to resist “the general 
march of absolutism all over the world.” Id. 
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tenure, a mission that he saw as part of his general concern 
with the spread of socialism.58 
It was in October of 1945 that Pound’s ennui and new politics 
meshed with the GMD’s growing public relations crisis. GMD 
Minister of Justice Hsieh Kwan-Sheng wrote to Pound, asking 
him to serve indefinitely as China’s main legal adviser.59 Alt-
hough Hsieh described Pound’s duties as an adviser in quite 
modest terms, Pound quickly accepted.60 His appointment sat-
isfied the GMD’s desire to improve its international reputation, 
but it was also part of China’s liberal legal reformers’ struggle 
for political capital against the dominant authoritarian ele-
ments in the GMD. This confluence of goals also exploited 
Pound’s ability to act as a conduit for enhancing the interna-
tional status of Chinese officials and his potential as a public 
relations agent to promote the general nationalistic sentiment 
to the world that, as expressed in the words of one law profes-
sor, “the Chinese have law.”61 
Following his acceptance, Pound sailed to China in 1946 to 
take up his new duties. He departed after spending the sum-
mer in China, though he would return in late 1947 for a longer 
stint that lasted through the summer of 1948. However, he 
would in fact spend the majority of his years as the GMD’s le-
gal adviser in residence at Harvard. He had planned several 
return trips after 1948, but these plans were upended by the 
GMD’s displacement by the CCP in 1949. 
Before Pound left for China in 1946, he had already begun to 
correspond with his first biographer, Paul Sayre, who claimed 
that “[Pound’s] work on the Chinese law generally was so vast 
                                                                                                             
 58. See MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 219–20 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1992) (describing Pound’s first anti-communist comments). Pound later more 
clearly attached himself that to the idea that socialism was in conflict with 
the rule of law. See Roscoe Pound, The Idea of a Universal Law, 1 UCLA L. 
REV. 7, 9 (1953). 
 59. Hsieh claimed that the GMD had in fact long wanted Pound to come to 
China, but were prevented by the Japanese invasion during World War II. 
POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, Reel 68, 247. 
 60. “Your work as adviser to the [Ministry of Justice (“MOJ”)] will consist 
mainly in giving advices and supplying materials on matters of judicial re-
form and other matters within the jurisdiction of the Ministry.” Id. at Part 3, 
Reel 68, 247. 
 61. Id. at Part 1, Reel 49, 0547. 
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that it would take the rest of his life.”62 Further, Pound saw his 
role as going beyond the reformation of Chinese institutions. As 
the challenges which China faced were so urgent, he could not 
simply set the institutional stage for educating the younger 
Chinese generations. He had to reshape the minds of those cur-
rently in power, and quickly. 
Pound’s appointment as adviser was received publicly and 
privately with great enthusiasm on both sides of the Pacific. 
One American newspaper editorial captured this spirit in the 
competitive Cold War terms that would come to define Pound’s 
China legacy: “In view of the fact that the Chinese will be pow-
erfully propagandized by the Russians, [Pound’s] presence in 
China and the influence [Pound] will be able to have in perhaps 
bringing the Chinese a juridical system somewhat in line with 
our own Anglo-Saxon tradition will be invaluable.”63 Most of 
these articles saw Pound’s work as an extension of America’s 
continued support of Chiang Kai-shek, the GMD’s leader and 
presumed Christian modernizer. Consequently, Pound was 
quickly approached by many popular publications for his com-
ments on Chinese legal reform.64 Expatriate newspapers in 
China posted similar articles and would periodically reprint his 
comments on Chinese law.65 Not surprisingly, his appointment 
resonated with the religious missionary infrastructure that had 
first involved him in Chinese affairs.66 
                                                                                                             
 62. SAYRE, supra note 20, at 384. 
 63. William Loeb, (Untitled), BURLINGTON DAILY NEWS, Feb. 16, 1946, at 5. 
The New York Times had several articles about his trip, once describing his 
work as “revising and modernizing the Chinese law code.” See, e.g., Leaves for 
China Today To Help in Law Revision, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1947, at 13. 
 64. War in China Greatly Exaggerated Ex-Dean Pound Tells Reporter Here, 
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, July 19, 1947 [hereinafter War in China]. In like 
vein, Lee Brisol, President of the China-American Council of Commerce and 
Industry wrote to Pound to offer the organization’s aid. POUND PAPERS, supra 
note 28, at Part 3, Reel 68, 192. 
 65. POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, Reel 100, 675. See, e.g., 
SHANGHAI EVENING POST, Dec. 17, 1946. 
 66. Charles Ransom, the first Dean of Soochow, telegrammed Pound his 
congratulations on “your proffered appointment for great service in China.” 
POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, Reel 68, 180. Pound would receive 
several letters from Marguerite Atterbury, a teacher and missionary at 
Yenching. Id. at Part 3, Reel 62, 300, 302 (stating that “your article on Chi-
nese Government is being eagerly read by church, professional and student 
groups”). 
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Pound came to China high on the new confidence of the post-
World War II American legal community. The status of Ameri-
can law had risen astronomically alongside American interna-
tional influence and was buoyed by confident self-assessments 
about the export of American law in Japan and Germany 
through the Marshall Plan. Legal periodicals and publications 
replicated the popular praise for Pound’s appointment, never 
questioning the terms or prospects for Pound’s eventual suc-
cess. In the Annual Survey of American Law, Pound was de-
scribed matter-of-factly as being “charged with the task of re-
writing the nation’s laws.” In one of his last articles for the 
ABA Journal written before his 1947 China trip, Pound’s ef-
forts were given an enthusiastic editorial introduction: “[t]he 
hopes and prayers of American lawyers are with him in his val-
iant efforts.”67 He also received a great deal of private support 
from members of the legal community, including ranking 
members of the judiciary.68 His colleague at Harvard, Warren 
Seavey, who had worked in China decades earlier, told Pound 
that “it is the most important job you ever had and that you 
can affect the destiny of the world by your work.”69 Carl Rix, 
then President of the ABA, praised Pound’s appointment as 
part of America’s destiny in the Far East.70 
For all this grandiose language describing his appointment, 
Pound’s correspondence indicates that his time in China was 
primarily spent dealing with the mundane concerns of living in 
a foreign city and partaking in the many social opportunities 
his fame and status enabled. Not surprisingly, Pound’s life 
while in China was heavily reliant on local intermediaries, as 
he led a fairly typical, sheltered expatriate life. Crucially, he 
                                                                                                             
 67. Roscoe Pound, Decisions of Courts Show Some Dangerous Trends, 33 
A.B.A. J. 1093, 1093 (1947). 
 68. ABA President Carl Rix told Pound that “it is a great task and one of 
tremendous importance to the world, and particularly to the United States. If 
you have laid a foundation for a new China, it will have a profound influence 
on the economic life of the United States.” POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at 
Part 1, Reel 69, 93. 
 69. Id. at Part 3, Reel 90, 853. This letter was addressed to “Poonds Koo 
Wen, Lauyeh,” the only hint that Pound or Seavey used pidgin Chinese. 
Pound told Sayre of his wide-ranging ambitions and that he was confident 
that “those who count here are with me and it looks as if I can succeed.” 
SAYRE, supra note 20, at 384–85. 
 70. See Carl B. Rix, Law and Government, 72 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 315, 315–
20 (1947). 
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came to understand his relationship to China in profoundly 
personal terms.71 In particular, he mirrored America’s love af-
fair with Chiang, even though Pound appears to have rarely 
consulted with Chiang about his official reform work.72 
Nevertheless, despite his formal retirement, he viewed his 
duties with great ambition. In the coming years, he penned 
numerous articles on Chinese law and the GMD, secured a sec-
ondary appointment as an assistant to the Ministry of Educa-
tion, lectured widely, drafted a robust range of reports for the 
Ministry of Justice, and prepared an empirical survey of Chi-
nese judicial practice. 
Pound’s first act as legal adviser before traveling to China 
was to submit a bibliography for the creation of a law library in 
Beijing.73 Once in China, he compiled comments on China’s 
constitution and developed a draft proposal for a juristic re-
search center.74 It is noteworthy that even at this early point, 
he had already gone far beyond the initial advisory scope of 
Hsieh’s description of his duties in China. 
In 1947, Pound wrote a personal report to Chiang in which he 
mentioned for the first time that he planned to write a com-
pletely new corpus of doctrinal treatises which he called the 
Institutes of Chinese Law.75 After his first summer in China, he 
wanted to stay stateside indefinitely to compile the materials 
for this project, which he felt only the libraries at Harvard 
could supply. In his letter to Chiang, Pound reported to the 
GMD about the many speaking engagements he had undertak-
en in America on their behalf and argued that being stateside 
would best allow him to continue his public relations work.76 
                                                                                                             
 71. Pound even took a personal interest in Chinese juvenile justice, as he 
had early in his domestic career. POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, 
Reel 62, 193. 
 72. There is significant evidence that Pound and Chiang’s personal rela-
tionship was mediated by Madame CKS, who wrote a series of letters to 
Pound thanking him for attending social engagements and for his various 
pro-GMD articles in the American press. See, e.g., id. at Part 3, Reel 62, 227. 
 73. Pound’s formal activities are directly recounted in a series of reports 
that he wrote to the GMD leadership about his work. The first report was 
written in May of 1946. See id. at Part 3, Reel 62, 10. 
 74. See id. at Part 3, Reel 62, 234. 
 75. This is the only extant evidence of any direct communication between 
the two men outside of formal social settings. Id. at Part 3, Reel 68, 272. 
 76. Id. This work initially included distributing reprints of his academic 
articles on China and copies of the Chinese Constitutions. 
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He spent only a brief time in China during 1947, although he 
produced a large volume of material for the GMD during this 
time, including a new curriculum for Chinese legal education, 
statutory analysis for the Ministry of Justice, and numerous 
academic articles for American law reviews.77 
During these short stints in China, Pound continued to spend 
most of his time engaged in a mix of social and professional ac-
tivities.78 He maintained his involvement with Soochow, and 
accordingly, delivered their graduation speech in the summer 
of 1946.79 He was also asked to give a series of lectures at the 
Jesuit Aurora Law School in Shanghai and at the National 
Chengchi University in Nanjing.80 
These engagements allowed Pound to build a network of elite 
Chinese contacts, both in China and at Harvard.81 He retained 
a number of papers and manuscripts by Chinese authors in his 
collection and claimed to have attempted to get some of them 
published in the United States.82 The transnational character 
of this interaction is quite evident in his personal correspond-
ence, and in one letter, a professor at Soochow asked Pound to 
                                                                                                             
 77. See id. at Part 3, Reel 62, 559; Id. at Part 3, Reel 68, 275. 
 78. Wherever Pound was in China, he was a popular speaker and his per-
sonal archive is full of dozens of invitations and thank-you cards in English 
and Chinese. Pound naturally gave speeches at the Harvard Club and a 
range of expatriate organizations. See, e.g., id. at Part 3, Reel 62, 65. 
 79. Conner, supra note 38, at 238. 
 80. See ROSCOE POUND, ROMAN LAW IN CHINA 441 (1953) [hereinafter 
POUND, ROMAN LAW]; POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, Reel 68, 172. 
These early lectures were republished in ROSCOE POUND, LAW AND THE 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1947) [hereinafter POUND, ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE]. 
 81. In one instance an official, the President of the Shanghai Supreme 
Court, had received permission to go abroad from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs but was denied funding by Ministry of Finance. So he turned to Pound 
who then said he would try to secure visiting teaching position at HLS. 
POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, Reel 68, 142, 168. 
 82. See, e.g., id. at Part 3, Reel 62, 648; Id. at Part 3, Reel 78, 140. Most of 
this personal correspondence echoed the same flattering tones as Pound’s 
early China correspondence. The President of the High Court in Shanghai 
sent Pound an article in early 1949 citing Pound’s praise of the President, 
and he thanked Pound quite profusely. Id. at Part 3, Reel 78, 145. Obviously, 
Pound anticipated a level of reciprocity from these arrangements as he wrote 
to the President of the Shanghai High Court asking him to talk to Hsieh on 
his behalf in respect to certain documents written for an IRS audit which 
Pound hoped would contain very specific characterizations of his work for the 
GMD. Id. at Part 3, Reel 78, 152. 
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lobby the ABA to let Chinese practitioners with foreign law de-
grees join American firms.83 
However, by the summer of 1947, Pound was concentrating 
all of his efforts on his planned treatises. He asked the GMD to 
create a committee to assist his scholarly efforts.84 Finally, true 
to his commitment to legal empiricism, he returned to China in 
the summer of 1948 to carry out the fieldwork he believed nec-
essary for his doctrinal work. He visited a range of different 
Chinese cities and collected the results of his empirical sur-
vey.85 
II. POUND AS FOREIGN LEGAL REFORMER 
A. Pound’s Evolutionary Legal Science 
The content of Pound’s public writings on Chinese law during 
his tenure as legal adviser reveals a great deal about how 
American lawyers were coming to understand their participa-
tion in foreign reform projects. Pound did not come to China to 
merely serve as a learned guide to America’s own remarkable 
but thoroughly contested legal history. Instead, he was to 
transplant aspects of American law as the apogee of interna-
tional legal development. To this end, in his academic writings, 
Pound constructed a specific vision of Chinese law that allowed 
Americans to both presume China’s legal inferiority but also 
justify high hopes for its Americanization. Animating Pound’s 
work was the expectation that the application of his legal ex-
pertise would lead to the positive development of China’s politi-
cal and economic life, which would emulate America’s while 
retaining some vague Chinese distinctiveness. He routinely 
managed to praise the GMD as willing and eager recipients of 
American legal knowledge, while making sure that he never let 
                                                                                                             
 83. Id. at Part 3, Reel 78, 142. 
 84. There is no evidence this ever actually happened. See id. at Part 3, 
Reel 62, 567. 
 85. See id. at Part 3, Reel 62, 277. Among these short trips were visits to 
Nanjing’s courts and the city prison, another to Shanghai to visit the High 
Court, and a trip to Hangzhou to conduct more on-site inspections and give a 
variety of lectures. These various day trips took Pound around China for most 
of the summer, ending in mid-August after ten weeks. There are few records 
left from the surveys Pound collected at the time, but he did plan to continue 
such work when he next returned to China. 
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such praise undermine the necessity of his involvement in Chi-
nese legal development. 
Pound’s move from comparativist to exporter comes across 
immediately in his writings on Chinese law. By the time Pound 
arrived in China, his own statements about the value of com-
parative law had become simply rhetorical, seeing China as 
solely a canvas on which to project American law, though al-
ways threaded with gestures of cultural sensitivity. 
Pound did emphasize that the GMD’s legal administration he 
observed was modern in its practice and formulation.86 The dis-
tinction of “modern” was important because everything about 
his work on China was aimed to promote his views on sociologi-
cal jurisprudence—the evolutionary endpoint of his narrative of 
common law historical development. 
Within this framework, Pound was always careful in his writ-
ings to assert that his expertise on Chinese law followed the 
basic empirical tenets of sociological jurisprudence. He at dif-
ferent points claimed to have made a careful academic study of 
Chinese legal institutions and legal history, although there is 
little evidence as to what constituted this background study.87 
He consistently grounded his authority in three avenues of em-
pirical investigation: “thorough inspections,” “attending confer-
ences,” and “carefully prepared [judicial] questionnaires.”88 
Pound routinely claimed that the cities he had visited consti-
tuted a representative sample of legal practice under the 
GMD.89 
At the same time, it was this asserted empirical expertise 
that Pound felt positioned him to be an informed cultural rela-
tivist. He went out of his way in his public writings to validate 
the positive characteristics of Chinese culture in an effort to 
offset claims of cultural incommensurability.90 Pound often con-
                                                                                                             
 86. ROSCOE POUND, THE TRUTH ABOUT CHINA: REPORT BY HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL DEAN 5–6 (n.d.). 
 87. Specifically “a thorough study of . . . Chinese constitutional and corpo-
ration law.” POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 1, Reel 122, 984. For his 
strongest articulation of his broad study of Chinese law, see Roscoe Pound, 
Progress of the Law in China, 23 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B.J. 345, 345 (1948). 
 88. POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, Reel 61, 418. 
 89. See Pound, supra note 87, at 359. 
 90. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Law in China as Seen by Roscoe Pound, in 
THE LAW IN CHINA AS SEEN BY ROSCOE POUND 1, 16 (Tsao Wen-yen ed., 1953) 
(“The Chinese are a patient, diligent, intelligent, idealistic people, filled with 
determination to set up and maintain a modern, democratic progressive poli-
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trasted himself with an unnamed former adviser who gave up 
on “Chinese justice” by claiming that Chinese culture and lan-
guage had no real “idea of justice.”91 If Chinese culture was too 
alien, then Americanization would seem doubtful. As such, 
Chinese law had to be deficient in comparison to American law 
but it could not be wholly foreign. 
This praise of China also fit into Pound’s own public asser-
tions that he was not promoting the crude transplantation of 
American law into China. At every turn, he denied that trans-
plantation was an effective methodology for legal reform. He 
noted that in their conferences, Chinese legal reformers did not 
debate best practices for “some abstract country,” but rather 
faced the particular difficulties of modern China.92 Thus, he felt 
that his empiricism demonstrated that he was not engaged in 
unreflective transplantation or blatant parochialism.93 
Yet whatever commitment Pound had to cultural sensitivity 
in abstract rhetorical terms, he was operationally wedded to 
the evolutionary assumptions that undergirded the new export-
driven view of American law. Pound himself had long been very 
clear in his belief that law was central to a civilization’s identi-
ty and progress.94 He believed that “law is not only a means 
toward civilization, it is a product of civilization.”95 He also 
claimed that law was central to the “agency of civilization” and 
the order provided by law clearly evidenced the greatness of a 
society.96 
                                                                                                             
ty . . . . They confidently expect to do this not by force of arms but force of 
ideals.”). 
 91. Id. at 3; Pound, supra note 87, at 349–50. 
 92. Roscoe Pound, Law and Courts in China: Progress in the Administra-
tion of Justice, 34 A.B.A. J. 273, 275 (1948). 
 93. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 90, at 15. 
 94. See EDWARD B. MCLEAN, LAW AND CIVILIZATION: THE LEGAL THOUGHT 
OF ROSCOE POUND 1–4 (1992). 
 95. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 51, at 143. 
 96. See ROSCOE POUND, SOME PROBLEMS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
IN CHINA 17 (1948). Thus, the longevity of a given civilization was dependent 
on a functioning legal system. See id. (“Stability is maintained by adjusting 
relations and ordering conduct by a systematic and orderly application of the 
force of politically organized society. . . . [As well as] by legislation, by legal 
reasoning, by technique of interpretation and application, and by interpreting 
and applying legal precepts . . . .”). Pound also echoed Weberian sentiments 
about the relationship of law to economic growth, claiming that “[w]here law 
is feebly developed, there is a feeble economic order.” Id. at 65. 
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As such, when Pound developed his theory of legal evolution, 
it was in practice simply a reiteration of his version of common 
law legal history, which culminated in the “greatness” of con-
temporary American law.97 He detailed his version of common 
law history through a four-staged evolutionary process which 
he called “The Socialization of Law.”98 The teleological view of 
social change inherent in Pound’s legal evolution showed that 
he remained optimistic about legal reform even after he had 
rejected the New Deal.99 
It became clear in his duties as legal adviser that Pound’s 
firm belief in legal evolution came into conflict with his prior 
commitment to comparative law. As mentioned earlier, Pound 
had been critical early in his life of the neglect of comparative 
law in America, a position he had reasserted as late as the mid-
1930s.100 In his writings for the GMD, however, Pound’s invo-
cation of comparative law was in practice hollow. The content 
of the comparative knowledge he invoked in his work as legal 
                                                                                                             
 97. It is not coincidental that the specific writings in which Pound articu-
lated his theory of legal evolution were refined during his time as legal advis-
er. 
 98. POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, Reel 61, 704. Pound saw him-
self as providing a more relevant series of progressions than the then popular 
six-fold articulation of Vinogradoff. For Pound, each “stage of legal develop-
ment” reflected progress towards his goal of harmonizing formal law with the 
actual conditions of social life. Archaic law, the first stage, focused on secur-
ing peace through mediation when other, more prevalent, informal forms of 
social control failed. The next stage, strict law, was concerned with providing 
a system of remedies for harms: it had no concept of legal rights and placed 
strict mechanical restrictions on judicial decision-making. The third stage, 
equity, represented the move of Western legal system towards reconciling law 
with morality, matching intertwined advances in “moral ideas” with “econom-
ic development and the growth of trade and commerce.” The great contribu-
tion of this stage was making the legal system cognitively open to social con-
ditions through precedent. The last stage, where Pound saw his contribution, 
was “mature law.” Here analytical judges restrain unprincipled articulations 
of equity and natural law through a scientific juristic practice. Id. at Part 3, 
Reel 61, 725. 
 99. Id. at Part 2, Reel 12, 1014. Pound had already presented a judicial-
centric view of the mechanism of legal history, with the same Whigish faith 
in teleology, including claims about “primitive law-givers,” self-help, and 
many of the popular evolutionary anecdotes redolent in common law doc-
trines. See generally ROSCOE POUND, THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE 
COMMON LAW (1939). 
 100. Roscoe Pound, What May We Expect from Comparative Law?, 22 A.B.A. 
J. 56, 58 (1936). 
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adviser was almost completely dominated by his early exposure 
to Roman law through German legal studies, and was peppered 
with very little analysis of contemporary foreign practices.101 
Pound’s move away from comparative law to this form of ex-
port work illustrates how the marriage of legal science and evo-
lution could sustain both highly universalist and parochial el-
ements.102 While he situated his claims about law within a uni-
versal methodology, he had a predetermined assumption that 
the results of such inquiry would inexorably lead to the evolu-
tionary developments which were typified in his view of the 
American common law. 
This implicit parochialism was made clear when Pound 
demonstrated no qualms about his belief that Chinese legal re-
formers did not need to be exposed to, and in turn contemplate, 
the controversies and shortcomings of American law. Here 
Pound’s thinking, like American legal thought more broadly, 
had stepped away from a dialogue with foreign legal experi-
ence.103 Pound positioned America as an evolutionary apogee, 
and seemed much less concerned with how this state was pur-
portedly achieved than simply assuming it to be so.104 The only 
dialogic element in his work was his attempt to use his work in 
China to bolster the legitimacy of his own theories of American 
law stateside, and not to present a critical engagement with 
Chinese legal scholars over American legal experience.105 
But in practical terms, and despite his own presumptions, 
Pound was confronted with a GMD legal system that had done 
little to mimic American law. Chinese legal reforms, beginning 
                                                                                                             
 101. See Arthur Taylor Von Mehren, Roscoe Pound and Comparative Law, 
13 AM. J. COMP. L. 507, 507–08 (1964). Pound would come to claim that com-
parative law should consist solely of a functional comparison of judicial tech-
niques, while producing no such study himself. See Pound, supra note 100, at 
59. 
 102. In the most general terms, he had come to only champion comparative 
law when it promised to support his existing intention to promote his legal 
science, not when it included dejudicialization or the welfare state—both con-
cepts with which comparative law became associated after the New Deal. 
 103. See HULL, supra note 20, at 282–83. This also helps contextualize 
Witt’s study of Pound and Melvin Belli, as Pound frequently cast his advoca-
cy for the plaintiff’s bar as an act of legal nationalism against foreign influ-
ences. 
 104. See Pound, supra note 100, at 57. 
 105. This foreshadows the recurrent critiques of contemporary law and de-
velopment efforts. See generally Kroncke, supra note 3. 
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in the early twentieth century, had explicitly rejected many of 
the juris-centric common law characteristics that he placed at 
the center of his own evolutionary theory. Most critically, in the 
1920s, the GMD had adopted a range of Soviet legal institu-
tions, especially in its criminal justice system. These institu-
tions not only focused a great deal of power and discretion on 
state agents, but emphasized prosecutorial, rather than judi-
cial, supervision of state power. 
Thus, Pound had to overcome a central and persistent chal-
lenge to his reform work: determining the place of the common 
law in China’s reforms. As Pound saw his trip to China as be-
ing in combat with absolutism, he had to represent his reform 
work as not promoting the Continental theories of law which 
his domestic politics had come to virulently oppose. Further-
more, he publically stated that the common law, by contrast, 
had a salutary effect all over the globe, and that its influence 
should be further intensified.106 But in China, Pound confront-
ed a legal system that in many ways was far more genuinely 
reflective of “absolutism” and the civil law than could ever be 
claimed about the New Deal. 
Pound’s solution to this problem, at least theoretically, was to 
continuously project China’s Americanization, and thus the in-
fluence of the common law, into the future. At times he argued 
that the common law was too complex to transplant to China in 
a short period of time107 and that “Roman law” could be a stop-
gap model for China.108 He also recognized that China’s legal 
elite had been educated under an equally diverse range of tra-
ditions. Therefore, he reiterated that China needed first to 
have a unified theory of law guiding the operation of its institu-
tions and a unified doctrinal synthesis of its various codes be-
fore it could transition to common law legal institutions.109 
Pound’s long-term solution to the conundrum of China’s civil 
law structure was to base China’s future Americanization on 
Chinese judges retrained as vanguards of his judicial tech-
                                                                                                             
 106. Roscoe Pound, What Is the Common Law?, in THE FUTURE OF THE 
COMMON LAW 3, 6–7 (1937). 
 107. “[Common law] materials are too unsystematic, too bulky, and too 
scattered, and its technique is too hard to acquire . . . .” Roscoe Pound, The 
Chinese Civil Code in Action, 29 TUL. L. REV. 277, 289 (1954). See also JIANFU 
CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 28 (2008). 
 108. See POUND, ROMAN LAW, supra note 80, at 444. 
 109. See Pound, supra note 90, at 10–11. 
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nique.110 Pound based his projection on the work of Chinese 
judges whom he believed would serve as the primary vehicle to 
adapt whatever law existed to social conditions on the ground. 
Again, this would happen assuming that they would properly 
follow Pound’s own ideal common law technique. However, he 
clearly elided the fact that China’s civil law influence did not 
embrace common law precedential authority or reasoning, even 
though so much of what he himself wrote about Chinese legal 
reform had to be functionally predicated on the structural im-
portance of precedent. 
Pound in effect ignored the existing structural realities of 
Chinese law and, perhaps sensing the inchoate sequence of this 
asserted legal transformation, often felt compelled to identify 
“common law influences” in the GMD legal system when actual 
common law institutions were absent. Pound thus sometimes 
cast his work as allowing the GMD to follow through on their 
desire to Americanize by “adapt[ing] provisions borrowed from 
Anglo-American law to a Continental legal system.”111 But, in 
the end, Pound would always retreat to arguing that whatever 
transplantation his reform agenda required would be in-
digenized purely through judicial decision-making, rather than 
constitutional or legislative process. Yet even these subtleties 
were often lost when interpreted by stateside audiences who 
simply accepted Pound’s characterization that China has al-
ready adopted the common law.112 
Pound’s contorted effort to represent Chinese law as amena-
ble to legal Americanization was also manifested by his circular 
treatment of Chinese legal history. To conform to his presump-
tion that China needed American law, he had to believe, fun-
damentally, that China had a “backward legal order.”113 How-
                                                                                                             
 110. See id. at 3. 
 111. Id. at 1. 
 112. Pound Discusses Legal Reform in China After Visit, HARV. CRIMSON 
(Sept. 27, 1946), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1946/9/27/pound-
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on comparative law of Western countries . . . . [a]lthough the Chinese have 
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 113. See Roscoe Pound, Introduction to CHEN LI-FU, PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE 1, 
7–8 (Jen Tai trans., 1948) [hereinafter Pound, Introduction] (examining the 
debate as to whether there is value in historical Chinese ideas about law and 
government); POUND, supra note 96, at 18. It is also true that, in many ways, 
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ever, to sustain his self-perception as a legal scientist and not 
an imperialist, Pound had to give some general validation to 
Chinese legal history. Thus, in public, he was always quick to 
turn his very general praise of Chinese culture into an open 
challenge to those who argued that there was little value in 
Chinese legal history for China’s contemporary reform.114 
This led quite naturally, then, to the question of what Chi-
nese legal history was for Pound, and what practical impact it 
should have on Chinese legal reform. He made it quite clear 
that when he said “history” he did not mean it in the same 
sense as it would apply in the West.115 He recognized that there 
had been dynastic codes, but claimed that they were only sets 
of ethical precepts whose lack of institutionalization led to 
there being “no model for the historical Chinese system.”116 
When he mentioned “Chinese legal history” what he really 
meant was recent twentieth century history, and predominant-
ly the GMD experience after the Japanese invasion in the 
1930s.117 
Here, his arguments for standardization in American law 
slipped effortlessly into the standardization implicit in his role 
as modernizer. He could claim that “traditional ethical custom 
and traditional legal institutions are not to be ignored,” but, in 
deciding what was proper for China, he could state that such 
traditions “should not be made to introduce a discordant ele-
ment into the codes and thus lead to inconsistencies and anom-
alies.”118 Pound then pushed this universalizing observation 
                                                                                                             
GMD legal elites themselves aggressively embraced this evolutionary judg-
ment. 
 114. See POUND, supra note 96, at 13. 
 115. “China did not and, indeed, could not build her codes upon a preceding 
juristic development of her own . . . .” Id. at 27. 
 116. Id. at 5–6; Pound, supra note 107, at 277. Pound did have the oppor-
tunity to learn about traditional Chinese juristic practice as for many years 
he was in possession of a massive multi-volume manuscript on dynastic law. 
POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 4, Reel 6, 147. 
 117. “For China, legal history must also be what the Germans call the in-
ternational history of the present law of China . . . .” POUND, ROMAN LAW, 
supra note 80, at 444. This narrow scope led Pound to claim that it “can be 
understood why there has been no more than a beginning of a Chinese legal 
literature.” Pound, supra note 90, at 5. The same was true of Chinese legal 
language. Id. at 3 (“Another difficulty . . . is lack of a fully developed Chinese 
juristic and legal terminology.”). 
 118. POUND, supra note 96, at 11. 
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further by claiming that “[m]odern law is not so much a prod-
uct of the life of each particular people as a product of the expe-
rience of civilized life and the reason of many peoples.”119 And 
this experience, in due course, always led to his version of mod-
ern American common law. 
Pound was again confronted by the dissonance between his 
abstract methodological commitments and his role as an ex-
porter. A robust valuation of Chinese legal history would have 
required him to acquire far more particular knowledge about 
Chinese law and then to interpretively reconcile the ways in 
which this tradition might conflict with what he deemed to be 
legal modernity.120 Even before his tenure as adviser, Pound’s 
valuation of existing Chinese law was presaged by Sayre as 
functionally irrelevant to the application of his own transform-
ative expertise.121 Sayre wrote that, “Pound sees the merits of 
the Chinese legal order and of the whole Chinese governmental 
structure, but as an educator, and as a jurist, he has been as-
signed one of the greatest tasks ever given to any man in cul-
tural history . . . .”122 
Just as Pound’s views on Chinese legal history proved func-
tionally peripheral, “comparative law” had only a minimal im-
pact on his work in China. Pound had always rejected histori-
cal jurisprudence’s focus on law as a cultural epiphenomenon, 
especially as the historicist view of law had, from Montesquieu 
onwards, long argued that the world’s legal traditions were in-
commensurable. Pound instead had to presume that legal 
knowledge could transcend cultural differences, a presumption 
necessary not only for top-down, state-driven legal reform, but 
                                                                                                             
 119. Roscoe Pound, Comparative Law and History As Bases for Chinese 
Law, 61 HARV. L. REV. 749, 758 (1948). 
 120. This impossibility is clear when Pound discussed the import of the jury 
system into China. See id. at 752–53 (“There is nothing in Chinese institu-
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 121. See SAYRE, supra note 20, at 382. 
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384 (comparing Pound’s work to that of the ALI). 
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also his own cross-cultural legal expertise.123 Yet he epitomized 
what comparative law had been moving towards for most of the 
American legal community—a process of implicit comparison 
mired in evolutionary trajectories. The implicit comparative 
dynamic involved solely contrasting China’s legal deficiencies 
to the assumed superiority of American law, or in this case, 
Pound’s own version of American legal history. To the extent 
that China itself engaged in comparative law, this was proper, 
not as a general scholarly practice per se, but in recognition of 
its current backwardness.124 Thus, Pound’s comments on com-
parative law during this time pulled him increasingly towards 
universalism, but only within the strictures of exporting a de-
politicized view of American law.125 
A telling example of how Pound’s early comparative commit-
ments were undermined by his export work was that, while 
Pound expressed his desire to carry out empirical analysis of 
China’s existing legal system, his voluminous writings on Chi-
nese legal reform were produced well before he had actually 
completed any of his initial surveys.126 This was true despite 
the fact that he had easy access to formal Chinese legal docu-
ments in translation. 
Pound thus resorted to a formalistic analysis of such docu-
ments to justify specific claims he made about law under the 
GMD, even though he repeated in his writings the anti-
formalist presumptions of sociological jurisprudence.127 He 
compared these documents with existing Western materials, 
with the primary aim of simply affirming their aspirations to-
wards modern law. On the subject of whether these documents 
actually reflected Chinese legal practice and general social 
conditions, he retreated to vague empirical claims that, in the 
                                                                                                             
 123. Pound invoked the popular interpretation of Japanese reform as em-
pirical proof that Asian legal modernization was possible. See Pound, supra 
note 107, at 277–78. 
 124. See POUND, supra note 96, at 22; POUND, ROMAN LAW, supra note 80, at 
442. 
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Chinese context, the foreign-inspired codes were not a barrier 
to their implementation, citing his personal observations.128 
For example, several of Pound’s articles began, somewhere in 
the initial paragraph, with the statement “China has excellent 
codes.”129 He made sure that it was known that his basis of 
comparison for this praise was modern law.130 At the same 
time, his writings on the codes rarely contained specific infor-
mation about their substance, but rather emphasized the na-
ture of their construction and local authenticity.131 He also had 
to recognize that the codes’ content was primarily of foreign 
origin.132 Pound could not pretend that the codes were a reflec-
tion of common law influences, and at times he again declared 
it acceptable that China temporarily looked for inspiration in 
the civil law. Nonetheless, he routinely supplemented these ob-
servations with almost spontaneous claims of how important 
core American legal institutions and ideas, such as the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, the jury system, judicial review, and 
adversarial procedure, would be to China’s current and future 
reforms.133 
Pound’s early restriction to formal legal documents also 
moved him, in what would soon be well-established Western 
practice, to focus attention on the written Chinese Constitution 
which, like its codes, he praised in relatively unrestrained 
terms. At first, he compared the Chinese Constitution to those 
of other countries, even once acknowledging the GMD’s Soviet 
influences. Yet his writing on the Chinese Constitution again 
revealed the dissonance between his compulsion to imbue Chi-
nese law with the common law, and the actual structure of the 
GMD system.134 
Essentially, Pound argued that China’s constitution followed 
the American tradition: a justiciable legal document which ar-
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ticulated specific rights and enabled strong judicial review of 
legislation.135 This claim was based purely on assertion and 
speculation about future trends. He acknowledged the clear 
language in the Chinese Constitution that rights were limited 
by legislation and that, far from exclusively following the 
American emphasis on negative rights, “it is true some provi-
sions in the Chinese bill of rights are hortatory.”136 
Retreating from the text of the document itself, Pound devel-
oped a theory of how Chinese judicial review would proceed by 
focusing on the work of famed Chinese political thinker Sun 
Yat-sen.137 In this analysis, “Chinese” became Pound’s inter-
pretation of Sun’s personal writings and an interpretation 
where Sun was transformed from a national socialist into a lib-
eral capitalist.138 
                                                                                                             
 135. See POUND, supra note 86, at 4. 
The Bill of Rights in the Chinese Constitution is not a mere preach-
ment. It is safeguarded by an independent Judicial Yuan—an inde-
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Id. 
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coe Pound, Development of a Chinese Constitutional Law, 23 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 
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noted that “[nationalism and socialism are] capable of sinister interpreta-
tion.” Id. To cast Sun’s principles in a favorable light and show that they 
were compatible with the American constitutional tradition required that 
Pound make several analytic contortions to discount fears that Sun’s work, 
and thus by proxy Chinese constitutionalism and judicial review, represented 
Continental influence. Pound conjured up the claim that Sun viewed twenti-
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It is critical to understand Pound’s treatment of Sun as it 
paralleled how Americans had come to interpret Chinese poli-
tics through the assumption that China was Americanizing. 
Pound asserted repeatedly that Sun was not only thoroughly 
Americanized but also an ardent proponent of judicial review. 
Viewing the Chinese Constitution as a product of Sun’s Ameri-
canized political philosophy allowed Pound to support his rhe-
torical claim that the Chinese Constitution was adapted to 
Chinese conditions, and was not an idealized document copied 
from abroad or constructed from “pure reason.”139 Through a 
strange sort of alchemy, Pound’s invocation of Sun allowed him 
to simultaneously claim that the Chinese Constitution was 
both American and authentically Chinese.140 
This formalistic and stylized analysis reveals the extent to 
which Pound’s invocations of local sensitivity were, in fact, 
functionally marginal in his scholarly work. Even at the level of 
comparative formalism, his export commitments strained the 
coherence of his analysis. Pound cast his mission as culturally 
neutral by claiming that his work was not “American” but 
based on his own theory of legal science. The empirical ambigu-
ity that existed about Chinese law in America at the time al-
lowed him to claim that sociological jurisprudence was feasible 
without anyone rising to challenge his claim on empirical 
grounds. Therefore, he could make strong relativistic state-
ments about the importance of Chinese conditions without ever 
claiming, or needing, any particular knowledge of what this 
                                                                                                             
eth century politics as a challenge to “claims of the individual man to a free 
existence,” consonant with Pound’s own views and his anti-New Deal fervor. 
See id. at 384. Thus he explained that for Sun, and for China, nationalism 
meant harmony, not militant nationalism; democracy meant the practice of 
individual negative rights, not populism; and socialism meant “a state which 
reconciles the individual and the social by a gradual process,” not, in fact, 
socialism. See id. 
 139. See Roscoe Pound, The Chinese Constitution, 22 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 194, 
194–98 (1947). 
 140. In fact, Pound’s entire understanding of Chinese constitutional inter-
pretation flowed from his particular valorization of Sun. Pound claimed that 
Sun’s political theory was a true indigenization of Western legal tradition and 
compared Sun’s writings to the Federalist Papers.. See id. at 194–232; Pound, 
supra note 92, at 273. Pound seemed to have drawn a great deal of his under-
standing of Sun’s work not from Sun’s actual writings but from a paper he 
read that enthusiastically compared Sun to the socially minded French ad-
ministrative legal scholar Leon Duguit. POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 
3, Reel 61, 291. 
112 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:1 
would, in substantive terms, dispositively mean. It was suffi-
cient that he simply legitimize his work through association 
with things categorically Chinese, regardless of what analytical 
sleight of hand was required to align them with his objectives. 
Thus, through his writings on Chinese law, Pound was able 
to successfully set himself up stateside as a crucial intermedi-
ary who possessed the method and knowledge to make accurate 
claims about Chinese law and qualify himself as a forecaster of 
the consequences of Chinese legal reform. Reciprocally, he was 
able to do so in a manner that validated his personal theories of 
law while affirming American hopes for China’s Americaniza-
tion. If one assumed that it was an unassailable fact that the 
GMD were liberalizers, then one also had to accept that Chi-
nese legal reforms were in consonance with American values. 
Thus, Pound’s participation in this process counter-intuitively 
gave him the benefit of casting his views as genuinely “Ameri-
can” by virtue of being involved overseas in the GMD’s re-
forms.141 Even though he had by this time rejected the Progres-
sive project, Pound could cite with approval China’s lack of a 
liberty of contract regime and use this claim to buttress the 
claim that his original critique of the liberty of contract was not 
an endorsement of socialism. For it was self-evident that 
Chiang, as America’s proper current liberal prodigy, was not a 
socialist.142 Like many who would later follow in his wake, 
Pound’s actual frustrations as a reformer were tangential to 
how his work was received at home, and did little to undermine 
the intellectual and political capital his work was able to gar-
ner.143 
Summarily, it was unnecessary that anything in China alter 
or enrich Pound’s preexisting ideas on law. Ultimately, for 
Pound, Chinese law was what it had to be to sustain his pro-
ject: an object to be transformed in the image of the world’s 
                                                                                                             
 141. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 139, at 225–26 (discussing the Examining 
Yuan and how it might alleviate the American problem of civil service being 
adversely affected by partisan politics). 
 142. See id. at 230. 
 143. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE 
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE 
CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002) (describing how the 
reception of American political and economic theories overseas and their sub-
sequent use to fuel embedded domestic political feuds, which the authors 
term “palace wars”). 
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most advanced legal system, American law. Whatever Chinese 
law was, or wherever it might be going, it was not the proper 
subject of any genuine comparative analysis. 
B. Pound’s Frustrations and Growing Ambitions 
It is revealing then to compare Pound’s academic writings on 
Chinese law with the materials he prepared privately for the 
GMD. Early on, he did not openly discuss his project in such 
grandiose terms with his Chinese interlocutors. He could not 
have been oblivious to Chinese nationalism, even with the 
stream of flattery that preceded his appointment. When accept-
ing his appointment, he denied to various Chinese officials that 
he had come to bring the common law to China.144 Yet, in the 
actual materials he produced for the GMD, he was in fact far 
less restrained in the scope of his ambitions than his initial 
disclaimers would have suggested. As noted, he generated a 
rather substantial body of material for the GMD over the 
course of just a few years. A great deal of these materials were 
simply rehashings of his earlier work, but they do show that he 
only grew more convinced over time about the need for him to 
shape every aspect of the GMD legal system. 
Still, Pound was careful to lace his reports for the GMD with 
repeated claims to cultural sensitivity and criticisms of a singu-
lar notion of “modernity.”145 He also expressed open-
mindedness toward the GMD’s choice to produce a hybridized 
legal structure based on non-common law traditions.146 Of 
                                                                                                             
 144. POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, Reel 68, 233. 
I may say to you, however, that I doubt very much whether in any 
large degree our system is applicable in China . . . our Anglo-
American criminal law and procedures are made for countries with 
the historical English legal traditions. I doubt whether the system 
could be impelled effectively upon a country without that back-
ground . . . . [I] cannot but feel that what is needed in China is not to 
go to the right about in the matter of criminal procedure by adopting 
a radically different system, but to go ahead making the best that 
can be made practical of the produce which you have. 
Id. 
 145. See id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 190. 
 146. “A Constitutional government must be a gradual growth, arising out of 
the institutions, customs, and ideals of people, not something borrowed and 
transplanted full-grown to which the people are expected to adjust them-
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course, he placed all of these statements within the context of 
the GMD’s expressed aspiration to become “modern,” and their 
bringing him to China to use his particular expertise to assist 
them in this process.147 He expressly claimed that the Chinese 
should feel no pressure to harmonize all of their legal doctrines 
with American common law and that he was in China to assist 
in Chinese legal reform rather than to transplant the American 
legal system.148 His reports to the GMD did criticize aspects of 
American legal practice, but only those that reflected his own 
existing critiques.149 For example, the one way in which Pound 
claimed that China had surpassed America was by creating a 
Ministry of Justice, an institution he had long argued for in 
America.150 Yet, as mentioned in the prior section, China’s 
preexisting legal traditions and characteristics had little prac-
tical impact on Pound’s actual recommendations to the GMD. 
Further, Pound’s reports to the GMD contained a range of 
documents presenting his earlier scholarship on American law 
as the definitive interpretation on which the GMD should base 
their understanding of legal reform and legal education. These 
included reports as broadly titled as “Rights” and “Law and 
Morals,” as well as specific commentaries covering sociological 
jurisprudence, the rise of bar associations, and recent develop-
ments in American legal education.151 Notably, following his 
general treatment of Chinese legal history, there was only one 
paragraph in all of Pound’s reports that concerned what he 
                                                                                                             
selves speedily and without fruition because of its intrinsic reasonableness.” 
Id. at Part 1, Reel 69, 120–21. 
 147. “In China of today, after centuries of isolation from the institutional 
development of the western world, you have a laudable desire to be thorough-
ly modern—to have a political and legal system abreast of the highest 
achievements of progress in the West.” Id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 152. 
 148. See id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 186, 240. 
 149. These included Pound’s critique of prosecutorial discretion—“The 
American district attorney, too often deep in politics, is not a model for China 
to follow”—and judicial elections, where “experience has shown that the sys-
tem has no advantages to compensate for the bad effects is has had.” Id. at 
Part 3, Reel 61, 523. 
 150. Id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 190, 121. Pound cites Cardozo’s support specifi-
cally. 
 151. Id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 725, 755. 
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thought China should retain from his truncated view of its le-
gal history.152 
Throughout these reports, Pound also repeatedly mentioned 
the importance of legal reform and the value of legal expertise 
to modern civilization.153 He glorified the role of lawyers and 
judges in American history, both of which were central to his 
version of common law history.154 Here he clearly replicated the 
American focus on private lawyers as the public/private media-
tors of American democracy, and assumed that lawyers would 
come to dominate Chinese politics.155 
As such, in his reports, Pound cast the GMD’s support of his 
legal work as key to their historical greatness. In one report he 
asserted that “the Chinese judge has an opportunity which has 
not been afforded any body of judges outside of the English 
speaking world.”156 He did not neglect the role of the law pro-
fessor, whom he described as possessing an opportunity for a 
grandiose legacy.157 Moreover, it would be law professors and 
judges working hand-in-hand that would allow his sociological 
jurisprudence to flower.158 
                                                                                                             
 152. See id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 184–85 (citing no felony-misdemeanor dis-
tinction, a unification of civil and commercial law, and no law-equity divide). 
 153. See id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 125. 
In a constitutional democracy, under a regime of the supremacy of 
law, in England and America the lawyers have divided the primacy 
with the soldier. In China also the regime of supremacy of law has 
been set up by the constitution. China too must rely upon the law-
yers to make the constitution achieve its purposes. 
Id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 366. 
 154. Id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 704. 
 155. “In a constitutional democracy lawyers have always taken a leading 
part in public life.” Id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 569. 
 156. “The course of judicial decision will determine how far the codes can be 
adapted to the life of the Chinese people and so how far a stable social and 
economic order be built upon them. The judges in China have an opportunity 
which they may well be envied.” Id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 558, 568. Also see 
“Problems of a Modern Judiciary,” “The Judicial Office in China,” and “The 
Training, Mode of Choice and Tenure of Judges.” Id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 150, 
521, 637. 
 157. See id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 568. 
 158. See id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 101, 129, 142. 
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As a result, he restated these claims in his plans for revamp-
ing China’s system of legal education.159 Here he presented a 
variation of Langdell’s post-graduate model as a universal evo-
lutionary advancement, neglecting any mention of alternative 
forms still prevalent in the United States, nor taking notice of 
Chinese citizens’ still limited access to undergraduate educa-
tion.160 
Pound also routinely argued for supplementary research in-
stitutions like those he had championed in America, including 
the American Law Institute, private research agencies, and so-
cial science-driven government agencies.161 Not surprisingly, 
such work would require the cooperation and support of the 
entirety of the Chinese legal profession with his vision.162 
Yet for all of Pound’s initial vigor as a newly appointed advis-
er, he quickly found that the GMD would not instantly embrace 
these sweeping reforms, if ever. His repeated assertion that his 
time would be more productively spent in the Harvard Law 
School library grew out of his early frustration with the recep-
tion of his reform proposals. His requests for support from the 
GMD repeatedly went unanswered, and there is little evidence 
that any of his suggested reforms were ever introduced in the 
legislature or even reviewed by the Ministry of Justice.163 
                                                                                                             
 159. Pound did believe that Chinese elites should go abroad for “cultural 
education.” Yet, he also felt that the current diversity in the training hin-
dered the development of coherent legal doctrines and the common technique 
with which he hoped to imprint Chinese judicial science. Id. at Part 3, Reel 
61, 138. 
 160. The post-graduate model of legal education Pound oversaw at Harvard 
was still far from consolidated in the United States at the time he went to 
China, but Pound quite clearly stated, in a report entitled “History and 
Standards of the Legal Profession,” that because of the development of the 
post-graduate, professional model of legal education “the level of general and 
professional education of American lawyers has been raised everywhere.” Id. 
at Part 3, Reel 61, 351, 366. See generally WILLIAM R. JOHNSON, SCHOOLED 
LAWYERS: A STUDY IN THE CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL CULTURES (1978); WILLIAM 
P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL 
EDUCATION (1994), for an overview of Langdell’s model of legal education and 
the rise of post-graduate legal education in the United States. 
 161. See, e.g., POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, Reel 61, 123, 147. 
 162. See id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 173. 
 163. From all of Pound’s record there are one official and two private indica-
tions that anyone read and gave him feedback on his reports. Id. at Part 3, 
Reel 68, 172, 220, 220A. 
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Some of his multiple frustrations found their way into his ac-
ademic writings, especially his view of the GMD leadership’s 
disposition to place political strategy above fidelity to legal 
principles.164 Moreover, he also wrote of his difficulty in teach-
ing Chinese students and leaders the concept of rights and jus-
tice as an individual virtue and other Western legal concepts.165 
But, in his public comments, he always softened any such criti-
cisms with the assurance that his work would quickly cure the 
defect.166 
Pound’s turn to writing Institutes of Chinese Law was thus a 
tactic to bypass his slow and unresponsive sponsors.167 His pub-
lic claims notwithstanding, he had no prospects for changing 
the Chinese codes or Constitution. Yet, after finishing plans for 
reorganizing almost every aspect of the Chinese legal infra-
structure, he became determined to develop this full corpus of 
doctrinal treatises through which Chinese law would be pro-
gressively reborn.168 While there is also no evidence that the 
GMD was supportive of this turn in his work, the project of-
fered Pound the benefit of removing himself from China and its 
political vexations, while still maintaining his personal com-
mitment to the GMD. The project promised a finished product 
that could simply be bequeathed to China after its completion. 
Pound only completed the first section of Institutes of Chinese 
Law before his position as adviser to the GMD ended in 1949—
Volume I. Chapter 1, “Introduction to the Science of Law.”169 
Here he laid out a sweeping interpretation of Western legal 
history and thought, beginning with law in the Roman era and 
including every major school of legal theory developed subse-
quently.170 In total, the completed introductory volume was ex-
pected to reach 1,530 to 2,150 pages, despite the fact that his 
                                                                                                             
 164. See Pound, supra note 90, at 6. 
 165. See Pound, supra note 87, at 349–50. 
 166. In regard to the politicization of legal questions, Pound wrote: “Here is 
something which the commission to write the Institutes of Chinese Law, 
which I am proposing, might well begin work upon immediately.” Pound, su-
pra note 138, at 390. 
 167. His records show various outlines of the proposed Institutes of Chinese 
Law and the expansion of their scope in subsequent drafts. See POUND 
PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, Reel 62, 1. 
 168. “The surest and soonest way to bring this about seems to me to be an 
institutional book covering the whole law.” Id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 139. 
 169. Id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 984. 
 170. See id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 185. 
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“Historical Introduction of Chinese Law” would begin only in 
the twentieth century.171 
The escalating scope of Pound’s work as legal adviser, even in 
the face of negative feedback, demonstrates that his belief in 
apolitical, culturally-neutral, expert legal knowledge provided 
no self-limiting principles for legal intervention. Whatever ges-
tures he otherwise made, the agency of Chinese culture or even 
Chinese legal elites was a secondary concern to the achieve-
ment of the transformation he envisioned and his capacity to 
carry it out. Pound had to realize that there was resistance to 
his ideas, but in his role as adviser, he never accepted the 
terms articulated by his Chinese hosts, and he continued to 
press the limits of his reform agenda. 
III. POUND AS STATESIDE PROPAGANDIST 
A. Pound’s Public/Private Split 
Pound’s work in China clearly demonstrates the analytical 
twists and turns necessary to operationalize his move from 
comparative lawyer to exporter, and at the same time publical-
ly paper over his failures. Yet his public relations work for the 
GMD even more forcefully illustrates how deeply the view of 
Chinese law as an object of Americanization severely under-
mined the American ability to assess the GMD’s legal reform, 
or lack thereof. 
Pound’s very presence in China reflected the fact that the 
GMD leadership clearly understood that it was centrally im-
portant for Americans to view them as willing to accept Ameri-
can law. In this regard, the GMD had already been active be-
fore Pound arrived in bringing legal scholars and officials to 
China for tours and to generate positive press.172 But to the ex-
tent that these efforts were inspired by a clear-eyed, if cynical, 
                                                                                                             
 171. Subsequent volumes were to include Volume I, Constitutional Law and 
Administrative Law (900–1000 pages); Volumes II and III, Substantive Civil 
Law (1000–1500 pages each); Volume IV, Criminal Law (800–1000 pages); 
Volume V, Remedial Law (1300–1500 pages); and Volume VI, Conflicts of 
Law and International Cooperation in the Administration of Justice (800–
1200 pages). A grand total of 7330 to 9850 pages—truly this was a project 
that would have taken him the rest of his life. 
 172. See Tsao Hwa Loh, Judicial Appointive System in China and How It 
Operates, THE PANEL, Jan. 1945, at 6 (discussing Milton J. Helmich’s trip in 
1944). 
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understanding of America, such strategic understanding was 
not reciprocated. 
By all measures, the GMD’s hopes for Pound’s efficacy on this 
front were validated even when he was himself increasingly 
frustrated as a reformer. At every turn, he was strident and 
uncompromising in his effort to maintain the image of the 
GMD as an Americanizing agent in China. Despite the fact 
that his actual reform efforts were rebuffed, Pound was locked 
into the belief that China was inevitably Americanizing, and 
that his best efforts were to simply help facilitate this process 
in spite of whatever untidy problems temporarily accompanied 
it. While his more academic work spoke to the methodological 
tensions his time in China generated, Pound’s public relations 
activities grew out of a murky area in-between his conscious 
misrepresentations of what he knew of the GMD’s problems 
and his own deeply entrenched resistance to accepting feedback 
that challenged his presumptions of the GMD as an agent of 
Americanization. 
As noted earlier, Pound’s public relations activities were im-
portant for maintaining the expectation of China’s Americani-
zation by the GMD to counter a rising tide of stateside critics. 
Many U.S. State Department officials had begun to criticize 
Chiang and the GMD as neither liberal in orientation nor in 
possession of popular Chinese support, and these officials em-
phasized diplomatic negotiation with the CCP. As a result, 
Pound always couched his defenses of the GMD as a necessary, 
sometimes even reluctant, reaction to unfair victimization and 
libel by the uninformed or badly intentioned.173 Most directly in 
the realm of foreign policy, Pound leveraged his general re-
nown to testify in Congressional hearings to press for contin-
ued support for the GMD.174 Here, Pound found a receptive au-
dience who wanted affirmation that American law was not only 
exceptional, but could be transformative abroad. 
To this end, everything that Pound wrote in the popular 
press about Chinese law validated the GMD’s commitment to 
legal reform in general, and American legal reform specifically. 
He also again made clear that China was incapable of reform-
                                                                                                             
 173. He had a duty to be “speaking on behalf of the Chinese Government 
which seemed . . . to be important in view of the general misinformation cur-
rent in [the] country and [the] persistent hostility of a section of the press and 
some of [the] periodicals.” HULL, supra note 20, at 312 (citation omitted). 
 174. See, e.g., 95 CONG. REC. 3765–67 (1949) (statement of Roscoe Pound). 
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ing itself without specialized American expertise.175 In this fo-
rum, his expressions of appreciation for the existing Chinese 
legal system functioned to promote the notions of commensura-
bility that drove the global export of American law.176 Further, 
in his speeches and popular writings, Pound often did not re-
strict himself to mere commentary on legal reform; rather, he 
lauded the GMD on every front from social service provisions to 
agricultural development.177 During his time stateside, he was 
often called upon by GMD officials to respond directly to criti-
cal pieces in the American and foreign press.178 It was this 
propaganda work, not his actual reform agenda, that inspired 
Chinese supporters domestically and abroad to write to Pound 
to express their gratitude.179 At the same time, many American 
citizens also wrote to him, praising his efforts in providing a 
clear-eyed and sober view of Chinese affairs. 
Naturally, Pound took aim most aggressively at criticisms of 
the GMD’s legal system and its Soviet influences.180 Pound not 
only rejected these attacks but also defended the conditions 
under which police, using their robust pretrial detention pow-
ers, detained citizens.181 He rejected criticisms that represented 
                                                                                                             
 175. See Pound Declares China Misrepresented in United States; Gives His 
Own Views, HARV. L. SCH. REC., Mar. 2, 1948, at 1 [hereinafter HARV. L. SCH. 
REC.]. 
 176. See POUND, supra note 86, at 5–6, 12. 
 177. See id. at 5–7. 
 178. In one such letter, Pound was directed to respond to a New York Times 
article by Nathaniel Pfeffer; he happily agreed and stated that “Professor 
Pfeffer’s statement is typically communist.” POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at 
Part 3, Reel 68, 301, 304. 
 179. Pound was often sought after for advice by American individuals and 
local organizations as to how to reconcile the conflicting reports on China; 
Pound always gave resoundingly pro-GMD interpretations. Pound was also 
often asked by members of the China Lobby for publicity and to serve on their 
organizations’ boards. Id. at Part 1, Reel 69, 214; Id. at Part 3, Reel 68, 141, 
256. 
 180. Id. at Part 3, Reel 68, 159. 
 181. “Police detention pending preliminary examination by procurators and 
before transfer . . . is short and in most of the cities where I inspected the 
place of detention is light, airy, and clean and will compare favorably with 
the better police stations in America.” Id. at Part 3, Reel 61, 442. See also 
Pound, supra note 87, at 347, 361. 
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Chinese judges as corrupt and self-serving.182 Given his per-
sonal affiliation with many such judges, he often took the 
strongest umbrage to these claims, and compared Chinese 
judges to American exemplars such as Joseph Story and Thom-
as Cooley.183 Pound also addressed the poor reputation of Chi-
nese lawyers, casting them as true patriots first, and self-
interested professionals a distant second.184 He claimed that 
the Chinese legal system as a whole was as efficient as could be 
expected under the circumstances, and only conceded that it 
was at times underfunded, citing this fact as all the more rea-
son to increase foreign aid.185 
Throughout all of these defenses, Pound was quick to com-
pare the GMD favorably to the CCP. He attacked arguments 
that the Communists were more responsive to the needs of the 
Chinese populace.186 In regards to legal services, he stated that 
while the GMD had worked to get the “machinery of justice 
moving again,” this was untrue in “Communist-held areas.”187 
He decried the recurring calls for the GMD to compromise with 
the CCP, in large part because he believed that the CCP did 
not believe in constitutionalism.188 
The most striking quality of Pound’s propaganda work was 
that, while it often mentioned law, the majority of his argu-
ments centered on the moral virtue of Chiang and the GMD 
                                                                                                             
 182. See Roscoe Pound, Other News of China, 10 AM. AFF. 176, 177 (1948); 
Pound, supra note 90, at 15; POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, Reel 68, 
112. 
 183. POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, Reel 68, 112. 
 184. See Pound, supra note 87, at 352. 
 185. Pound said that administrative delays did exist, but this was only 
when there was a lack of funding or military disruptions. See Pound, supra 
note 90, at 14–15; POUND, supra note 86, at 12. 
 186. Critics often pointed to the CCP’s rural programs as the telling con-
trast to the GMD’s urban cronyism. Pound addressed the problems of the 
peasantry by noting that the GMD had invited many American agricultural 
reformers to China to increase production and ease the lives of farmers. See 
Pound, supra note 182, at 178. 
 187. Id. Pound also addressed the popular issue of women’s rights, long a 
fetish of American observers of China. Here, Pound disputed that the CCP 
was doing anything for women and contrasted the CCP’s inaction with the 
formal gender equality articulated in the Chinese Constitution, as well as the 
number of women he saw in GMD governmental positions. See POUND, supra 
note 86, at 9–10. 
 188. See id. at 2 (“Coalition of a constitutional government operating under 
a Bill of Rights with Communists is impossible . . . .”). 
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leadership. Pound emphasized the moral values of exceptional 
individuals as overcoming any particular institutional or cul-
tural barrier to China’s Americanization.189 Thus, he argued 
that evaluations of democracy in China had to be interpreted 
through the work of these exceptional figures as fighting 
against the backwards Chinese populace.190 In this way, he 
gave Chiang great credit for building up a “strong progressive 
government” in the context of an often recalcitrant nation.191 
Pound also foreshadowed how this emphasis on moral virtue 
would come to rebut the harsh criticisms of many of America’s 
subsequent authoritarian allies during the Cold War. He de-
fended Chiang’s openly authoritarian practices as evidence of 
his practicality in a time of war.192 He also made sure to men-
tion that Chiang placed himself under the law, while defending 
Chiang’s emergency powers as mild in comparison to American 
historical precedent.193 Pound’s invocation of transitional emer-
gency was also rife with references to the need for “security,” 
and Pound invoked the specter of unstable regimes abroad that 
had adopted democracy too quickly and had become “democra-
cies on paper.”194 In fact, Pound told his audiences that the 
GMD were such incorruptible liberals that they were often too 
                                                                                                             
 189. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 182, at 177–78. 
 190. See POUND, supra note 96, at 10–13. 
 191. Pound, supra note 182, at 177. Pound often cast his description of 
Chiang in quite personal terms. 
You ask me about Chang Kai Shek. I saw something in him, had 
some talks with him, and observed the operation of government un-
der him particularly as to the administration of justice and organiza-
tion of courts. He impressed me as a strong man with a high sense of 
duty, an earnest desire to establish and maintain constitutional 
democratic government and a democratic way of life in China. 
POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, Reel 68, 174. 
 192. See Pound, supra note 182, at 177–78. See also HARV. L. SCH. REC., 
supra note 175; Pound, supra note 107, at 277; Pound, supra note 92, at 274. 
 193. POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, at Part 3, Reel 68, 112. Pound compared 
criticisms of Chiang to charges of constitutional violations made against 
Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War, against Japanese internment during 
World War II, and against the military rule imposed on Hawaii before its 
ascension to statehood. See POUND, supra note 86, at 13–14; Pound, supra 
note 182, at 176. 
 194. Pound, supra note 139, at 198. See also POUND PAPERS, supra note 28, 
at Part 3, Reel 61, 155, 174. 
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idealistic and not sufficiently appreciative of the importance of 
order.195 
Pound’s propaganda work also presaged the growing venom 
of post-New Deal politics, as he gave no quarter to critics of the 
GMD. He always opted to question critics’ political loyalty ra-
ther than their strategic analysis. He routinely complained 
about the influence of such experts and further argued that 
they either did not have any real knowledge of Chinese condi-
tions or that they proceeded from a purely anti-American ideo-
logical bias. With obvious irony, he also placed blame for other 
failed U.S.-GMD projects on such experts, claiming that the 
GMD’s great faith in America could lead them to rely “too much 
upon advice from experts from the Western world unacquaint-
ed with the conditions to which their advice was to be ap-
plied.”196 
Thus, in reaction to the idea that America should pursue dip-
lomatic relations with the CCP, Pound responded with vehe-
ment claims about the broad support enjoyed by the GMD and 
the anti-American nature of questioning the successful export 
of American law to China.197 He characterized a claim that the 
GMD enjoyed no support from the intellectual or business 
elites as an “outrageous statement.”198 He routinely denied that 
the CCP had any real popular support in China, at times claim-
ing that there was “no Communist Party in China,” and at 
most that there were “scattered Communist agitators and con-
spirators here and there.”199 For all his claims of war-time exi-
gency, he also increasingly came to attack those who claimed 
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that the Chinese Civil War was a real contest.200 Moreover, 
Pound repeatedly told American audiences that the GMD was 
China, and that criticism of the GMD was a violation of the 
long-standing American tradition of supporting China’s mod-
ernization. He assured his audience that America was still held 
in the highest regards in China, as it had been for over a centu-
ry.201 
Pound stayed true to these positions until the bitter end. He 
had for many years argued that China’s future was secure “un-
less outside promotion of [C]ommunism brings about another 
era of disruption.”202 He denied problems within the GMD until 
the actual expulsion of the party from the mainland, and as 
late as 1949 he responded to questions about internal strife in 
China by offering up that he had seen “none at all.”203 
B. Pound’s Strategic Distortions 
In Pound’s public and semi-public roles, he projected an im-
age of himself as both a clear-eyed observer of Chinese affairs 
and a welcome reformer of Chinese law. To varying degrees, his 
projections were directly shaped by the context and contour of 
the new export-driven view of American-led foreign legal re-
form. Pound represented the GMD and its legal reforms as the 
willing recipients of American benevolence, and claimed that 
they were on the straight path to liberalization and democrati-
zation. He continued to justify his role as reformer by replaying 
the classic trope of faint praise that condemned Chinese back-
wardness but validated the Chinese potential for rehabilitation 
through Americanization. There is little doubt that he honestly 
believed in the general aims of this project, and that this belief 
made him an effective advocate for the GMD. Yet, at some 
point, the ardent nature of his public relations work for the 
GMD has to be reconciled with the fact that, as a legal reform-
er, his work yielded absolutely no results, and, tellingly, 
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pushed him away from any collaborative projects with the 
GMD during his tenure. 
What Pound’s archives reveal is that he practiced a dialogic 
of public confidence and private frustration that was rational-
ized by his unfailing faith in his ultimate mission. He simply 
rejected out of hand any and all developments in China that 
would invalidate his utility as a reformer or call into question 
America’s self-congratulatory view of Chinese affairs. Yet, de-
spite what he may have claimed publically, or even hoped per-
sonally, he received a great deal of critical information about 
Chinese affairs from sources outside of the GMD. 
Throughout Pound’s personal correspondence it is clear that 
he saw his mission in China as dovetailing with his larger po-
litical agenda, and that this was not a reversal as has been 
previously claimed.204 Instead, it was part of his preexisting 
fight against absolutism and, with growing emphasis, against 
communism. In his letters to Seavey, Pound unambiguously 
stated that he felt that the GMD were allies in America’s larger 
Cold War struggle.205 
It could be argued that Pound’s idealized view of the GMD 
can be explained by his limited and highly orchestrated exist-
ence while living in China. Certainly, the Chinese elites with 
whom he interacted reinforced such beliefs—even those legal 
reformers who struggled consistently against Chiang’s authori-
tarianism.206 In this vein, some commentators have assumed 
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that Pound was kept in the dark both about Chinese politics 
and the dim prospects that his agenda would be enacted.207 
Yet, from Pound’s earliest contacts in the 1920s with Chinese 
legal scholars, he knew of the GMD’s domestic troubles, as well 
as about the uglier realities of Chiang’s weak commitment to 
democracy and legal reform.208 More directly, Pound’s high-
profile appointment made him attractive to those Chinese legal 
elites outside of the GMD establishment who wanted to voice 
their criticisms to a respected foreigner.209 Pound received de-
tailed letters from reformers and judges who had been cast out 
of the GMD after agitating too aggressively for liberalizing re-
forms. These lawyers—many of whom asserted their own com-
mitment to American legal values—warned him that the GMD 
was only interested in his utility as a propagandist.210 In one 
such case, Pound carried out an extended correspondence with 
a Western-educated reformer from one of China’s minority lib-
eral parties who consistently provided him with an alternative 
view of GMD policies.211 Yet Pound never validated the con-
cerns or criticisms expressed in these letters, and he was likely 
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guarded in his responses given his public appointment. Howev-
er, the content of these letters could not have been completely 
lost on him, and even though they had their own public strate-
gies, it seems unlikely that none of Pound’s GMD interlocutors 
shared their struggles with him.212 
Pound again steadfastly chose to see any defects in Chinese 
law as institutional and merely transitory in light of his moral 
evaluation of the GMD leadership. This allowed Pound to echo 
extant criticisms of the GMD in his reports as adviser, while 
simultaneously rejecting them in his public writings.213 And 
when he did make concessions in his public evaluations of the 
GMD, he made sure to articulate these defects as stemming 
from the influence of his domestic opponents, academically and 
politically.214 What this advocacy work also clarifies is that 
Pound’s loyalty was to Chiang and the GMD first, and “China” 
and the Chinese people second. It was the GMD that provided 
a bulwark against the spread of Communism, and especially 
against CCP populism. 
It is thus clear that Pound knew a great deal more, or at the 
very least was exposed to a great deal more, critical infor-
mation about the GMD’s legal system than he ever publically 
admitted, especially as to Chiang’s limited commitment to “the 
rule of law.” On one level, his public writings can be cast as 
simply trying to build more support for his own work within 
the GMD out of a paternalistic interpretation of what the 
American public “needed to know.” Here, the inerrant cultural 
confidence of the era imbued Pound with a personal confidence 
that served to cripple rather than enrich dialogue about Chi-
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nese legal developments through strategic misrepresentations, 
however well-intentioned. 
Somewhere in Pound’s mind the alchemy of his faith in legal 
science and Americanization provided the rationalizations that 
kept him motivated in the face of repeated failure and frustra-
tion. This is, in essence, the self-reinforcing power that made 
modern American legal exceptionalism such a durable ideology. 
Collectively, presumptions about American superiority, legal 
evolution, a depoliticized science of law, and a deep moralism 
about the GMD all joined together to move Pound to promote a 
public image of successful legal reform efforts in China, despite 
only rhetorical encouragement from his GMD sponsors. 
IV. POUND & LAW IN COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY 
A. Pound’s Anti-Communist Legalism 
Whatever tensions Pound faced in reconciling his sense of 
mission with his many practical frustrations, they were, ironi-
cally, relieved with the CCP’s successful expulsion of the GMD 
from the Chinese mainland in October of 1949. The CCP’s vic-
tory quickly became known in America as “the loss of China.” 
This phrase reflected the presumption that China was Ameri-
ca’s to lose. However, it proved true that the “loss” had a pow-
erful impact on the competitive rubric of the Cold War. Rather 
than give him pause, after the events of 1949, Pound’s support 
for the GMD, and his anti-Communist rhetoric on China, only 
intensified. 
When Pound returned from his last trip to China in 1948, he 
had taken up a temporary appointment at UCLA’s new law 
school. Even though Pound’s time in China had no impact on 
his intellectual views, it did crystallize his anti-Communism.215 
His appointment was not accidental, as California’s proximity 
to China made it a hotbed for GMD supporters in America, who 
were frequently referred to as the “China Lobby.” While at 
UCLA, Pound became embroiled in the controversial tenure of 
the law school’s first dean, L. Dale Coffman, whose own stri-
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dently anti-communist views garnered Pound’s unswerving 
support, but also led to Coffman’s ultimate ouster.216 
As stated earlier, Pound was already a critic of socialism and 
communism before starting his work for the GMD. But it was 
not until he arrived in China that he became a rabid and publi-
cally active anti-communist. Notably, Pound’s views on free 
speech had shifted several times during his lifetime, and he 
had not been involved in the early struggles over communism 
at Harvard. During World War I he had actually been a vocal 
critic of communist prosecutions and had openly challenged the 
Palmer Raids.217 Yet by 1948, he not only devoted a great deal 
of his efforts to anti-communist causes but, during his ap-
pointment at UCLA, he had become a strong proponent of loy-
alty oaths for academics and regularly brought red-baiting to 
evaluations of foreign legal reform efforts.218 
Pound became specifically well-known for his criticisms of 
communist influence at Harvard, and, notably, he had a specif-
ic antipathy for the renowned Chinese historian John Fair-
bank.219 Therefore, a review of Pound’s behavior during this 
time strongly indicates that he never questioned his support of 
Chiang as even indirectly in service to authoritarianism, but 
interpreted his experience as a foundational stimulus for the 
reactionary politics of his later life.220 
At no point did Pound characterize his work in China as a 
failure, but rather used the “loss” as political capital to call for 
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even greater legal reform efforts abroad.221 After 1949, he con-
tinued to write in glowing terms about the legal system of the 
GMD during the 1940s, and he never acknowledged that he 
had seen any political censorship or repression during his stay 
in China. Furthermore, and like so many before and after him, 
his appointment, however brief, had immediately transformed 
him stateside into a “China expert.” He was approached not 
only for his political commentary on Chinese development, but 
also for his opinions on specific cases involving Chinese law or 
litigants.222 
Pound’s first formal anti-communist affiliation was with Al-
fred Kohlberg’s American China Policy Association (“ACPA”). 
Kohlberg was a leading member of the China Lobby, and, like 
Pound, his anti-communism was catalyzed by his experience 
working in China. In December of 1946, Kohlberg first ap-
proached Pound to ask him to join the ACPA based on his new 
advisory position with the GMD. Pound quickly accepted, stat-
ing that “the Association is taking exactly the right stand with 
respect to China.”223 From that point onward, Pound partici-
pated in ACPA affairs, though it was not until after 1949 that 
he fully embraced his role in the organization and became a 
member of its board of directors. His many years of corre-
spondence with Kohlberg expressed the stridency of his convic-
tions, including his full support of Senator Joseph McCarthy.224 
During his time in China, Pound also broadened his partici-
pation to include other anti-communist groups.225 Pound be-
came routinely cited in a number of other pro-GMD and anti-
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CCP publications.226 It was through such participation that he 
influenced lawyer Pierre Goodrich, whose Liberty Fund sup-
ported the publication of Pound’s scholarship during the 1950s 
as it laid the groundwork for the rise of modern libertarianism 
in American law.227 During his later years, Pound was often 
contacted by lawyers looking to network through him into the 
anti-communist movement, and, in return, they offered to fur-
ther publicize his views on China.228 
Pound’s main contribution to the China Lobby’s efforts was 
allowing them to use any creative characterization of his ten-
ure as legal adviser to support the GMD and cast doubt on its 
domestic critics. Moreover, Pound’s claims about Chinese law 
became all the more valuable as law became a common point of 
contrast for distinguishing the United States from the Soviet 
Union. Like the American legal profession generally during 
this era, Pound emphasized the centrality of law in the Cold 
War struggle, a view that served as a key element in the fur-
ther hardening of American legal parochialism. This anti-
Soviet discourse began soon after Kohlberg had recruited 
Pound, and Pound was happy to allow Kohlberg to cite his 
views in any manner he pleased.229 
Thus, in the post-1949 era, Pound became an important fig-
ure in the transformation of America’s view of Chinese law 
from a fertile soil for Americanization to “Communist law.” 
Pound claimed that “law and lawyers are the most effective 
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foes of Communist absolutism”230 and that China’s future was 
now a contrast between “Soviet rule . . . [and] a constitution.”231 
Shortly after 1949, Pound began work on his main anti-Soviet 
publication. In that publication, he sourced the roots of his re-
jection of Soviet law to his time spent in China.232 
Like many of its legal critics, Pound linked Marxist theories 
of law, often through Pashukanis, to the New Deal.233 Through 
linking the loss of China to New Deal legal thought, Pound be-
came useful to the broader anti-communist lobby by serving as 
not only an expert on China, but also on Soviet law.234 At the 
same time, his transformation into an anti-communist expert 
gave him a platform from which he could express his personal 
views on religion and law with much more confidence. Pound 
could now, as a legal scholar, more easily strike out against the 
now reviled atheism of the Soviets.235 
Pound was also important to Sino-American affairs as a con-
duit for shifting the dream of Americanization from China to 
Taiwan. Even though he would not travel again to Asia after 
1949, he maintained his contacts with the GMD legal elites 
now in Taiwan. He continued to publish articles on Chinese 
law under the GMD as part of larger debates on foreign aid to 
Taiwan.236 Pound also continued to write letters of recommen-
dation for GMD officials’ children to attend Harvard Law 
School, and he received letters from Chinese lawyers and aca-
demics asking for help in procuring employment or publication 
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in America.237 Even some of those who had provided criticism of 
the GMD to Pound prior to 1949 were now anxious to court his 
favor, and, self-servingly, provided him with the same over-
stated evaluations of Taiwanese and mainland Chinese affairs 
that they had previously sought to rebut.238 
As such, legal elites in Taiwan had a continued interest in 
glorifying Pound and his work as a former legal adviser. This 
led several Taiwanese presses to republish his earlier works.239 
Ironically, his reception even among GMD scholars presaged 
how limited American legal advisers’ control would often be 
over the interpretation of their ideas in foreign contexts. 
Whenever Pound was cited in Taiwan, it was almost always to 
support the centralization of a legal system that gave little 
power to the judiciary.240 
This steady flow of trans-Pacific flattery and encouragement 
helped sustain Pound’s commitment to the GMD until his 
death in 1964. In the fifteen years since the “loss of China,” his 
experience had become a rhetorical prop to validate his anti-
communist agenda, while his frustrations during his time as an 
adviser were all but forgotten. In sum, for all the ready lessons 
that could be drawn from his experience in China, the GMD’s 
defeat for Pound only bolstered the assumption that American 
law was both exceptional and should be fervently exported, ex-
panding the global scope of its universalism while entrenching 
its parochialism.241 
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B. Pound’s Legacy as Failed Exporter 
The fact that Pound’s time in China has for so long been 
passed over for study speaks in many ways to the very ordinar-
iness of Pound’s legal reform project to contemporary sensibili-
ties. Decades later, some biographers would still be content to 
state without detailed comment that Pound was invited “to vis-
it China and rewrite its legal system” and to characterize this 
as just another of his many reform efforts.242 Today, the image 
of the American legal expert going abroad has become com-
monplace, even routinized, in America’s international legal re-
lations. American legal ideals and institutions are now typical-
ly assumed to be imbued with socially transformative potential. 
Where such export was once deemed to provide a necessary line 
of defense against communist expansion, now it is often seen as 
an effective instrument against a wide swath of authoritarian 
regimes.243 
In personal terms, a great deal of Pound’s prior intellectual 
commitments made him a poor prospect to achieve actual re-
form in China. His theory of common law adjudication resolved 
tensions in his own intellectual positions through aspirational 
claims about future legal developments that did not require 
him to face the present realities of China. It also allowed him to 
successfully mask his practical failures with a soothing theory 
of American legal superiority and common law triumphalism. 
The increasing polemic of his later years reflected the fact that 
the logical coherence of his entire intellectual universe was 
based on a future supposition about the effects of sociological 
jurisprudence detached even from American legal experience. 
As a great escape from his challenges at home, in China Pound 
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further convinced himself that his legal science was more im-
portant than local politics and, in doing so, imagined that legal 
reform abroad was easier in less “advanced” legal systems than 
it had proven to be stateside. 
It is true that Pound was seduced by the adulations he had 
long received from Chinese quarters, but the depth and 
breadth of his commitment to this project of Americanization in 
China defies the dismissive characterization of him as simply a 
fickle grandstander.244 He was frustrated in China, but his 
larger commitments sustained his work even when his legal 
ideas and reforms were ignored by the GMD. It is significant 
that Pound never recommended reforms for Chinese law that 
he had not consistently recommended for American law, and 
there is no evidence that he saw his time in China as a refuta-
tion of sociological jurisprudence.245 If anything, his time in 
China emboldened his preexisting faith in the necessity of judi-
cial empiricism to combat absolutism, even if he did not con-
demn Chiang’s own absolutistic rule. 
As a reformer, Pound’s attempt to actualize this ideal failed 
because—following a theoretical distinction of his own crea-
tion—he presumed that his judicial empiricism was the “mod-
ern element” that all legal systems could share as a template to 
lay over whatever particular “ideal element” their national cul-
tures possessed. Yet so much of what he took as “modern” was 
not only culturally and historically specific to his version of 
American common law, but also represented an inherently po-
liticized distribution of social and political power that invaria-
bly implicated entrenched interests in China. His presumptions 
were thus all the more limiting for the actual implementation 
of any legal reform through China’s highly contested political 
system. While perhaps honestly believing that China offered 
him a chance to enact his ideal system outside the restraints of 
American politics, his turn to solo work such as his Institutes of 
Chinese Law at Harvard revealed that he came to privately re-
alize that this comparative free rein was an illusion. 
Pound’s broadened commitment to anti-communism further 
aggravated these issues as it heightened his resistance to the 
empirical feedback he had received that would have challenged 
his loyalty to his project and the GMD. This personal dynamic 
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paralleled the larger American rejection of legal cosmopolitan-
ism, where the “loss of China” only made the desire to success-
fully achieve legal reform elsewhere more urgent. More than 
ever, Pound needed to reconcile his belief in a common human 
legal science with the inherent parochialism of American legal 
exceptionalism now writ large into the Cold War. As such, his 
scholarship after 1949 showed no indication that he “learned” 
anything from his experience in China, though he included ref-
erences to work on Chinese legal history in his final five-
volume opus, Jurisprudence.246 He rarely mentioned Chinese 
law outside of his advocacy work, and he pursued no further 
study of Chinese subjects. Even the transnational mutualism 
he aspired to earlier in his work—using his characterization of 
GMD reform efforts to validate his own ideas at home—
understandably disappeared after 1949. 
If China did have an impact on Pound’s thought, it was in 
clarifying how he thought his work could be universalized. His 
anti-communism broadened his global gaze. As early as the 
1920s, he had extolled the imperial theory of Roman jurists like 
Grotius, and he expanded his general judicial theory to include 
a valorization of the ability of international jurists to coordi-
nate international society.247 Pound also included statements 
about this drive towards global legal unification in his early 
writings on China,248 and here he cast international rights as 
“reasonable expectations involved in life in civilized society.”249 
During the late 1940s, he had begun to write on “world law” 
and “globalism.” 
After 1949, however, he lost this faith in global cultural unifi-
cation and rejected the strong claims of internationalists about 
“universal law.”250 His experience in China may have damp-
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ened his enthusiasm for total global homogenization, but it 
clearly only strengthened his belief that his universal theory of 
modern law was nevertheless a global solution. Pound had lit-
tle faith in international legalism per se, but full faith that 
whatever good could come from internationalization would be 
through the influence of modernized American common law, 
and not through the cosmopolitan participation central to his 
early career. 
What is perhaps more important than evaluating the specif-
ics of Pound’s reform mission is understanding how it clearly 
resonated with, and reinforced, the newly entrenched image of 
the American lawyer as a foreign reformer. At the time, domes-
tic commentators rarely scrutinized or even mentioned exactly 
what Pound was doing in China or how he was going about it. 
Even Pound’s allies who agitated against the New Deal as a 
great paternalistic affront had little hesitation in presuming to 
know the proper shape of Chinese law for China.251 All that re-
ally seemed to matter was that Pound was a famous American 
legal scholar doing what American lawyers now did abroad, 
that is, “develop” foreign law towards a version of modernity 
pre-scripted as Americanization. 
No one, even his political opponents on Chinese affairs such 
as John Fairbank, ever requested that Pound produce his data 
on Chinese courts, and most certainly not after 1949. That 
most of his public writings on China were formal analyses of 
documents compared, often only implicitly, with an idealized 
form of American law, generated little criticism. Few chal-
lenged the idea that Chinese law was flawed in comparison to 
American law, and, even in his pro-Taiwanese writings, Pound 
helped contribute to the idea that Chinese culture was anti-
legal and that China now had “no law.”252 Lastly, he continued 
to deny agency to China or Taiwan when he cast American ac-
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tion as determinative of both pre- and post-1949 developments. 
China had become an ideal type of American legal reform 
abroad far removed from domestic concerns, and, like all ideal 
types, was rarely troubled by reality. 
CONCLUSION 
Given Pound’s good intentions, one would hope to be able to 
identify salutary effects of Pound’s work in China on either 
Chinese law or American understandings of Chinese legal de-
velopments. But outside of perhaps developing some affective 
personal relationships, there genuinely seems to be almost 
none.253 His work had little impact on the GMD’s legal reforms, 
and possibly only aggravated the elitist tendencies of the liber-
al legal cohort that ran counter to the CCP’s successful grass-
roots rural political strategy. More problematically, Pound did 
not use his time in China to embrace the comparativism of his 
early life and therefore did not test and refine his own legal 
thought. Neither did he give American audiences clear-sighted 
insight into Chinese affairs, even when he had relevant infor-
mation on what the “rule of law” meant in Chiang’s China. 
Further, he presented his Chinese interlocutors with none of 
the complexities of American legal experience, thus inhibiting 
them from developing critical perspectives on American law. 
Ultimately, after his failure, he chose not to question his own 
presumptions, but instead proactively, and in reactionary 
terms, entrenched a dogmatic view of American foreign legal 
reform work that fueled the newly ascendant form of American 
legal exceptionalism that rejected his early commitment to 
comparativism. 
While all of this may in some way serve to characterize 
Pound as ethnocentric or imperialistic, the basic fact remains 
that his view of Chinese law reflected, in lockstep, the general 
assumptions of the American legal community. In concrete 
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terms, Pound’s time in China is a strong example of how this 
new export-driven view of American law abroad rarely served 
American interests effectively. While it is often possible in his-
torical analysis to identify specific groups which benefit from 
spectacular failures, it is nevertheless difficult to see any 
American or Chinese benefit from the events leading up to and 
following 1949—save in some limited sense the GMD dictator-
ship that soon emerged on Taiwan. 
Pound, like America more broadly, was trapped by his pre-
sumptions. He could only argue for some version of Americani-
zation abroad as the solution for foreign legal development. 
While Pound saw himself as engaging in a scientific endeavor 
that was presumptively universal in approach, his evolutionary 
and parochial assumptions recursively compelled the same 
substantive conclusion regardless of the realities of local condi-
tions abroad or the actual complexities of American legal histo-
ry. By assuming that Chinese law was only an object of change, 
Pound’s intellectual views could not be influenced by his many 
frustrations and failures as a reformer. He did not seek to learn 
from Chinese legal experience, but he also could not learn from 
his personal experience and so become a better legal reform-
er—abroad or otherwise. 
Nevertheless, Pound and his high profile appointment were 
historically important in that they helped increase the visibil-
ity and status of the American lawyer’s new role abroad, and in 
doing so, reinforced the deeply flawed valuation of legal science 
over local politics inherent in foreign reform efforts. Pound’s 
representation of legal developments in China was paradigmat-
ic for American legal reformers abroad. He reconciled the ten-
sions and negative feedback in his technical reform work by 
personalizing his efforts, most directly in the high moralism he 
used when discussing the GMD and Chiang. Here, Pound was 
swept away by the politics of legal reform in authoritarian re-
gimes that would become prototypical during the Cold War 
era—where it was believed that transcendent individuals 
would overcome any local resistance to American legal re-
forms.254 His high moralism, woven into his evolutionary view 
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of legal science, did little to inspire sober assessments of par-
ticular foreign legal systems. 
It is critical to note that even though Pound did not expound 
upon the extant controversies of American law while in China, 
American politics during this period was actively grappling 
with its own domestic legal reform issues. The view of America 
as solely an exporter of legal knowledge actually served to nar-
row the empirical range of American legal debates, in effect 
closing American legal culture off from the experience of so 
many other nations, most of whom increasingly faced the com-
mon legal difficulties of a globalized world. Instead, for Ameri-
can law, the international legal world increasingly paralleled 
Pound’s view of foreign law as split between emulation and 
contagion. 
It is in the mid-twentieth century move to place American 
law outside and above international legal development that the 
primacy of new export efforts in American foreign legal rela-
tions became intertwined with the marginalization of compara-
tive law in America. By the mid-twentieth century, the promise 
of genuine comparative legal analysis had been lost to Pound, 
as it had been to the larger American legal community.255 As 
Pound’s story illustrates, foreign law was no longer a site of 
critical inquiry alongside which Americans could contemplate 
their own legal development. Rather, foreign law was solely a 
perpetual subject of American influence or potential threat. 
The legal internationalism that accompanied America’s new 
status as a superpower certainly had global ambitions, and the 
new legal exceptionalism now necessitated that the practical 
defects of foreign legal systems were to be compared to ideali-
zations of American legal history. Sophisticated comparative 
lawyers still practiced their craft at the margins of the Ameri-
can legal community.256 However, even their best efforts could 
do little to substitute for what once had been a much more 
broadly shared commitment to comparativism.257 
We can most directly see the lasting imprint of the ideas and 
approach with which Pound viewed Chinese law by looking at 
the manner in which they are still deeply embedded in Sino-
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American relations today.258 While Pound’s story is largely un-
known to most American lawyers who are presently attempting 
to influence Chinese legal development, the same pitfalls in-
herent in his export-oriented view continue to plague contem-
porary “law and development” work related to China. In the 
past three decades, the resurgence of interest in Chinese law 
by Americans has rearticulated much of Pound’s reform ideal-
ism, despite the fact that China has a forthrightly authoritari-
an regime.259 
Summary reports concerning the decades of post-1978 Ameri-
can legal reform work in China reveal that American lawyers 
and activists, even as they carry his same altruistic intentions, 
are repeating Pound’s errors, from the projection of American 
ideal types onto Chinese conditions to the flawed search for 
apolitical engagement with an actively adaptive authoritarian 
regime.260 Just like Pound, analytic contortions are made to op-
timistically project strong judicial review into China’s future.261 
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The basic idea that Chinese legal reform can be cajoled and 
molded according to American influence remains at the heart of 
international legal discourse from subjects as broad as human 
rights treaties to World Trade Organization ascension.262 
Moreover, just as in Pound’s time, there are many current Chi-
nese reformers—as diverse in normative outlook as China’s in-
ternal political landscape—looking to learn from, not simply 
ape, American legal experience.263 And potential interlocutors 
are just as poorly served as they were in Pound’s time by the 
skewed idealizations inherent in export-driven perspectives.264 
Pound’s tenure in China shows clearly that the broad-ranging 
scholarly search for comparative legal knowledge that charac-
terized his early career was replaced by a well-intentioned, 
though ultimately self-defeating, desire to reshape the world in 
particular images of American law. This desire to reshape oth-
ers was historically central to the particular form of modern 
American legal exceptionalism criticized today as inhibiting 
American legal development by setting American law outside 
the currents of global legal experience.265 Especially today, 
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when American legal reform is as contested as ever internally, 
and where our legal solutions to pressing and basic social prob-
lems are still unresolved, such presumptions are not just self-
defeating abroad, but they are a comparative disadvantage at 
home. Until we admit the possibility that we might have some-
thing to learn and contemplate from even legal cultures such as 
China’s, which we are so practiced at dismissing, then we likely 
will rarely see China, or ourselves, as clearly as a globalized 
world demands. 
It is fitting to conclude with perhaps the most insightful 
thing Pound wrote during his later life: “How may we expect to 
realize an ideal of universal relief from poverty, distress, frus-
tration or fear before we have found out how to bring about 
such a condition in our local society?”266 
If only Pound, no less America, had truly taken this to heart. 
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